

THE
CROZER QUARTERLY

APRIL, 1928

ISSUED BY THE

Faculty of Crozer Theological Seminary

SPENSER B. MEESER, *Managing Editor*
RITTENHOUSE NEISSER, *Business Manager*

CONTENTS

	PAGE
EVOLUTION AND THE HIGHER LIFE OF MAN. Frederick Tracy	131
FROM WEST TO EAST: A STUDY IN THE BACKGROUND OF AMERICAN FOREIGN MISSIONS. Oliver Wendell Elsbree	140
RELIGION AND EDUCATION: AN INTEGRATION. Charles M. Bond	157
A PHILOSOPHICAL SUPPORT OF MYSTICISM. Stewart G. Cole	169
SOME NOTES ON THE PARABLES. Milton C. Westphal	184
THE STORY OF THE CHRISTIAN CHURCH. R. E. E. Harkness	200
WHO'S WHO IN THIS ISSUE	208
NOTES AND CURRENT DISCUSSIONS. Spenser B. Meeser	210
WHAT'S WHAT IN THE MAGAZINES	222
BOOK REVIEWS	234

Printed for CROZER THEOLOGICAL SEMINARY by
THE JUDSON PRESS, PHILADELPHIA

Price, 40 cents. Annual Subscription, \$1.50, post free

THE CROZER QUARTERLY

Entered as second-class matter, December 21, 1923, at the post-office at Chester, Pa., under Act of March 3, 1879.

Acceptance for mailing at special rate of postage provided for in Section 1103, Act of October 3, 1917, authorized December 21, 1923.

Copyright, April, 1928, by Crozer Theological Seminary.

Vol. V

APRIL, 1928

No. 2

EVOLUTION AND THE HIGHER LIFE OF MAN

FREDERICK TRACY, PH. D., LL. D.

Professor of Ethics in The University of Toronto, Canada

THE topic is so worded as to indicate the limits within which this paper proposes to confine itself. If the subject were simply "Evolution," it would be far too wide for one short article; for the conception of evolution is applied to the entire cosmic order and all that it contains. If it were "Evolution and Life," it would still be too comprehensive for my purpose, requiring a discussion of the whole field of biological evolution; a task for which I have neither the space nor the qualifications. Even the phrase "Evolution and Man" would be rather too large, for I do not propose at present to consider everything that is to be found in human nature, but only certain aspects of man's being, those aspects which, by almost universal consent, are regarded as the "higher" or "nobler" parts of his nature; not the things in which he assimilates himself to the lower or subhuman forms of life, but those in which he differentiates himself from the subhuman and affiliates himself with the superhuman; not the things in which he links himself with the animals, but those in which he links himself with the gods, as Aristotle would say, and reveals the divinity that is in him.

What is included, then, in the "higher life of man," as distinguished from his lower or more animal life, may be defined as all those regions of his experience in which he is not merely pushed this way and that by forces, either physical or psychical, but inspired to free activity by ideas and ideals. Man, of course, is pushed this way and that by forces, both physical and psychical. If he steps over the edge of a precipice his body falls by the physical force of gravitation. And within his conscious life there are all sorts of psychical forces, such as instincts, appetites, and passions, which exert their own influence upon his behavior, pushing and pulling him this way and that, in a manner quite analogous to the action of the physical forces.

But man is not merely moved by forces; he is inspired by ideas and ideals, and under the inspiration of these he carries on activities whose reach and meaning are not to be wholly defined, either as the satisfaction of animal wants, or as the gratification of egoistic desires. There is the ideal of *truth*, alike the incentive and the goal of all scientific investigation and all philosophical reflection. There is the ideal of *beauty*, the inspiration of the artist, the poet, and the musician; the supreme object of unsullied love, as Plato tells us in the *Symposium*; beauty that embodies itself in myriad forms, and may be sought and loved, as Emerson puts it, in every fair sky, in every fair flower, in every fair face. And there is the ideal of *goodness*, or moral value, the primary postulate of all who distinguish that which is better from that which is worse, as well as the goal of all the striving of those who in any degree do honestly hunger and thirst after righteousness.

The point is that man is not merely a *physical* being, dwelling in space and time, and subject to the laws of physical forces; not merely a *living* creature, subject to the laws of life; and not merely a *sentient* being, provided with a nervous and muscular mechanism fitted to serve the interests of his sensory-

motor existence. He is much more than this, and he does much more than this. He constructs *general concepts* that go far beyond the range of sense perception. He cherishes *desires* whose satisfaction would mean infinitely more than the mere gratification of animal appetites. He makes *choices* that involve much more than reflex action or instinctive movement. He feels *regret* when he realizes that he has made the worse choice instead of the better (nor can "worse" and "better" here be taken as necessarily identical with "materially disadvantageous" and "materially advantageous" respectively; nor can the regret be interpreted merely as the vexation that comes from the consciousness of having made a "bad bargain"; for he sometimes feels regret over actions in which he has secured material advantage or made a "good bargain"). He sets before him *ideals* of possible attainment, and pursues these ideals steadily, through years, it may be, of deferred hope, and in the face, it may be, of numberless obstacles, and at the cost of much suffering.

He is capable of being moved to the truest altruism and of being actuated by the profoundest sympathy. He shows himself willing, not only to recognize his brother's rights, but to respond to his brother's needs. Upon occasion he stands ready to make the greatest sacrifices, for causes which he deems worthy; even life itself not being considered too much to give. With all his capacity for evil he is unquestionably endowed with the capacity for good; and with all his love for what is low and coarse he has proved in countless instances that those qualities set forth in the Saviour's Beatitudes may be in some measure realized in his own life and character.

Moreover he reaches out in his thought beyond the things that are seen and temporal to the things that are unseen and eternal. He talks of God, whom no man hath seen at any time, and of a future life, in spite of the fact that there is no demonstrative evidence on the matter one way or the other. And the problem is whether evolution, as it has ordinarily been con-

ceived, is a sufficient explanation of these things belonging to the higher life of man, these things wherein he seems to separate himself by a great gulf from all the subhuman orders and to exercise a prerogative distinctively and peculiarly his own.

Another way of stating our problem would be to point out that human beings are able to comprehend not only what is actual but what is ideal, not only causal connection, but moral value. The world of human experience has two fundamental aspects, and not one only. On the one hand it is a world of facts and forces, and on the other it is a world of values and meanings. It is not only a vast arena whereon many things are happening; it is also a place where it is better for some things to happen and not others; a place where some things ought to be, even though they actually are not, and where some things ought not to be, even though they actually are. And these distinctions are grasped by the mind of man.

Now you explain a force by describing what happens when that force is in operation; and you explain a fact when you point out its cause; but you cannot explain values or meanings in this way, nor show how one thing can be of greater value than another. Still less can you show why a man should feel himself under moral obligation to seek the one rather than the other. The most complete account of the causes that have led up to a good deed, or an evil one, will not enlighten us as to why we should do the one and avoid the other.

It is precisely at this point that the doctrine of evolution, in its earlier form, seems to many thoughtful persons inadequate to furnish a complete account of man. It deals with facts, but not with values; with causes, but not with reasons; with processes, but not with purposes; with desires, but not with duties. It undertakes to describe how man has come to be what he is; but it does not tell us why man should feel himself under obligation to be other than he is. It confines itself to the realm of forces, but ignores the realm of ends. I am

aware, of course, that naturalistic evolutionary theory has much to say about "ends," and that it even speaks of some ends as "higher" or "better" than others; but so far as the theory is consistently naturalistic an *end* is simply an *effect*, brought to pass by assignable causes, and, apart from a purely gratuitous theory of value (the hedonistic) no evidence is furnished to show that "better" means anything else than "further evolved," or that "action" and "end" are anything other than "antecedent" and "consequent" respectively.

The one supreme law of the universe, according to Spencer, is the law of causation. There are no phenomena, whether physical, biological, psychological, sociological, or moral, that lie outside its jurisdiction, and there is nothing in the world of matter or in the world of mind which it is incompetent to explain. The original, inscrutable cosmic force, operating according to the law of causation, takes on the two forms of matter and motion, and, by the distribution and redistribution of these, produces all the things that are, and all the events that happen, throughout all time and all space. But obviously this tells us only what has happened and is happening; it does not tell us what ought to happen and what ought not to happen.

Both Mr. Darwin and Professor Huxley, with characteristic candor, have recognized this difficulty. Darwin does his best to show how that which we call "conscience" may be nothing more than a highly developed form of the primitive social instincts which are common to man with all the higher animals, but he confesses himself unable to see how such human qualities as altruism, sympathy, benevolence, and pity, "the noblest part of our nature," can be accounted for by natural selection alone. Huxley, so far from agreeing with Spencer that the moral order is being realized through the evolution of the cosmic order, declares emphatically that the two orders are at war with each other, and that "the methods that lead to success in the struggle for existence are not the methods by

which moral excellence is achieved.”¹ And both Darwin and Huxley point out that the influence of natural selection appears to diminish as evolution advances. It is most potent among the least evolved creatures, least potent among the most highly evolved. Among savage peoples the weak, the helpless, and the inefficient, are treated with scant compassion. Natural selection is allowed to take its course. The unfit are eliminated. But among more highly civilized peoples every effort is made to check the process of elimination, and to prevent the law of natural selection from taking its course. And the more civilized we are, the more pains we take to care for the weak, the helpless, and the inefficient. The motive of the highest morality, and the aim of the most practical philanthropy, is not the survival of the fittest, “but to fit as many as possible to survive.”

To such a mind as that of Nietzsche, committed to the view that the one law of the universe is the law of force, all this appears wholly evil. There should be no attempt to interfere with the principle of natural selection. Christianity therefore, which stands conspicuously identified with that attempt, and whose most representative parable is that of the Good Samaritan, or that of the Good Shepherd going out after the lost sheep, he regards as a system of stupid and purblind obscurantism, or even as a “fatal and seductive lie.” The attempt to put the ideals of Jesus into practise in a world like this, is fatuous and futile, and if it could succeed, would only mean disaster.

Mr. Darwin, so far from entertaining such views as the above, emphatically declares that these very qualities, which impel the civilized man thus to check and thwart the process of natural selection, belong to the higher life of man, and that we could not stifle the outgoings of sympathy, compassion, and such-like motives, “without deterioration in the noblest part of our nature.” And Mr. Huxley is with Mr. Darwin on this point. The supreme values are in the moral order; and there-

¹ *Ethics and Evolution.*

fore there is nothing for it but to make that order to prevail, so far as it lies within our power to do so, unless we are prepared to see the higher values set aside and the lower values establish themselves in the earth.

So far as I can see, Mr. Huxley never got beyond this keen and poignant sense of an acute and chronic warfare between the natural and the moral order; but in more recent discussions one may see much evidence of a growing conviction that the antagonism may be transcended, and that mechanism and causality are but the means and the instrumentalities by which values are to be realized. This means, not that evolution is refuted, but that there is more in it than is commonly supposed. It cannot be a merely mechanical process; it must be also a teleological process. The cosmic order in general, and the higher life of man in particular, are to be explained not merely by the category of cause, but by the category of meaning, or purpose, or value. For, especially in the higher life of man, purpose and value are the determining conceptions.

And so, on the way to full-orbed idealism, or theistic evolution, we find men writing about "vital energy," "creative synthesis," and the "grand strategy of evolution." We hear of evolution as producing not only new forms, but new values. We are being told that the whole evolutionary process implies some appraisal of values, and that natural selection is not an appraising or strategical agency.² It is being suggested that natural selection must either include, or be supplemented by, moral selection, through which not merely the fittest, but the best, shall survive. We are hearing of "emergent evolution," and to the question "What causes the emergents to emerge?" the answer is returned that God is "the *nisus* through whose activity emergents emerge, and the whole course of emergent evolution is directed."³ We have so eminent a scientist as Professor J. Arthur Thomson declaring his belief

² Patrick, *Introduction to Philosophy*, Chapter VIII.

³ C. Lloyd Morgan, *Emergent Evolution*, Lecture II.

that a directing mind is at the heart of the evolutionary process, and so eminent a philosopher as Professor Sorley speaking of the earth as fitted by its very imperfections to be the scene of the struggles and triumphs of the human spirit, as it strives to realize that freedom and autonomy with the potentiality of which it has been divinely endowed, and declaring that no cosmic theory is complete that does not take account of faith and love and heroism, which are facts of life, "as certain as the dance of electrons or the principle of the conservation of energy."⁴

It has been suggested that all the motives and springs of human action may be thrown into two classes, the self-maintaining and the race-maintaining, that these might be designated, for brevity's sake, hunger and love respectively, and that in the course of evolution there is a progressive ascendancy of the second over the first; that is to say, of love over hunger, or of altruism over egoism; and that love is creation's final law.⁵ This means, I take it, that the "moral order" is the higher meaning of the same universe of which the "natural order" or the "cosmic order" is the lower meaning, and that in the course of evolution this higher meaning is realizing itself in increasing measure, relatively to the lower meaning, and making itself progressively dominant over the latter. And it does seem to me that if evolution is to continue to serve as the explanation of all that man is and of all that he is capable of becoming, it must be interpreted, not merely as a law of inscrutable force, but also as a law of purpose and value. Its formula must be broad enough to cover not only the impulses and appetites of the natural man, but also the aspirations and strivings of the moral man. It must be adequate to account for the heart-searchings of the penitent, the longing after spiritual emancipation, and all self-forgetting philanthropy. It must interpret the pursuit of goodness for its own sake, it must

⁴ W. R. Sorley, *Moral Values and the Idea of God*, Chapter XI.

⁵ Thomson and Geddes, *Evolution*, Chapter VIII.

reveal the secret of all untarnished love and all unselfish devotion, and it must reveal the source of the inspiration of ideals and all progressive realization of the higher life of man. It must be competent to explain not only the ape and the tiger, but also the Good Samaritan, and the Good Shepherd, and Father Damien, and Doctor Grenfell, and the Salvation Army, and the League of Nations.

FROM WEST TO EAST

A STUDY IN THE BACKGROUND OF AMERICAN FOREIGN MISSIONS

OLIVER WENDELL ELSBREE

Associate Professor of History, Bucknell University

THE title of this article was suggested by one of the leading thoughts developed in a sermon delivered in Philadelphia by Gordon Hall, one of America's first foreign missionaries, on the eve of his departure for India. In his youthful enthusiasm Hall was led to make some comparisons between the West and the East as suitable fields for missions. It was not his purpose to speak in a disparaging way of the heroic labors of pioneers from John Eliot to Samuel Kirkland and their efforts to convert and civilize the American aboriginies, yet his conclusions were that such labors had in the end proved well-nigh fruitless. An Oriental mission would be less expensive and more certain of results. Indian missions involved not simply evangelizing and teaching the red men but also feeding and clothing them and equipping them with agricultural implements, sawmills, and tools for industry. The missionary to the Far East, on the other hand, could devote himself to his mission of preaching and teaching. Nor would he be obliged to grapple with the linguistic problems which the Western missionary had to face through absence of written languages. The American Indians had no culture worthy of the name. Converts had not always been uplifted by their contacts with civilization, especially when the trader brought liquor to them. The careful instruction of a patient missionary over a period of years was frequently nullified when a war broke out or when liquor could be obtained. The number of the Indians, after all, was relatively small if placed over against five hundred million Orientals who were civilized and in possession of written

languages, some of which were already being mastered by British missionaries. Learned men had made researches in Asiatic literature, science, religion, customs, and laws. William Carey had translated the Bible into several languages of the Hindus. The open door was to the East, not to the West.

But American missions were not to be diverted from West to East in just the way that Gordon Hall implied in his sermon. Hall's preference for the Oriental field and his ardent enthusiasm for the work he was about to begin led him to suggest the abandonment of further efforts to Christianize the Indians if such efforts threatened—as he believed they did—to interfere with the Far Eastern mission. That Eastern missions would intensify rather than detract from the work nearer home was a proposition unproved and apparently absurd to his mind. Abandonment of the Indian work, however, was not necessitated because American Christians turned their faces to the East. As an illustration of the actual result, the American Board, four years after Hall and his companions sailed for India, assumed the responsibility of evangelizing the Cherokee Indians of the Southwest, an enterprise which the General Assembly of the Presbyterian Church had, in the early years of the century, begun and abandoned.

Even William Carey, that great pioneer leader in modern foreign missions, was not anxious that Americans turn from West to East. In fact he sought to prevent the kind of change that Hall was pleading for just before the latter sailed for India. Carey felt that American Christians had prior obligations to the heathen at their doors. If they wanted a foreign field, why not try Jamaica? At any rate, more strenuous efforts might be made to Christianize the Indians. In his correspondence with Rogers of Philadelphia and Baldwin of Boston he refused to regard the linguistic difficulties involved in Indian missionary work as insuperable barriers. He was grateful to his American friends for their generosity in sending him money in 1806, but he made it abundantly clear that

he believed that their responsibility was to the West rather than to the East.

The practical failure of all the early missionary enterprises among the Red Indians did have something to do with hastening the hour when American Christians were to send workers to the East. William Carey's opposition to the change from West to East, on the other hand, may possibly have dampened the enthusiasm of some and, perhaps, resulted in the postponement, by a few years, of the organization of American Foreign Mission Boards. Neither factor, however, was of great significance in the rise of the spirit of foreign missions in the United States. It is necessary to probe somewhat beneath the surface to determine what were the influences at work during the two decades and more, before 1810, when the new spirit was forming, which were sufficiently effective in inducing an ardent desire on the part of the leading religious bodies in America to have a share in the larger task of world evangelization.

In the first place, American foreign missions constituted but one of the numerous benevolent enterprises which had their origin in the quarter century following the adoption of the Federal Constitution. The rise of local missionary, tract, and Bible societies, Sunday schools, and orphanages testified to the awakening of the benevolent and humanitarian spirit. In the decade following the beginnings of American foreign missions the impulse of disinterested benevolence was to initiate the first asylums for deaf mutes; the American Colonization Society, an organization designed to promote the interests of the free Negroes; a society for promoting the gospel among the seamen; and societies for the suppression of vice and intemperance. Each organization was certain to aid and be aided by the others. All depended on the willingness of Christian people to give of their time and money toward projects designed to benefit mankind. There were three distinct sources for this humanitarian impulse. Two of them contributed indirectly to the foreign

missionary project through their arousal of the humanitarian spirit. The third made its direct contribution in providing the men and machinery of missions.

The spirit of democratic individualism, as preached by Jefferson, heightened the value of the common man. Enlightened philosophers in Europe during the latter half of the eighteenth century were predicting the end of the old social order based on injustice and tyranny, and the dawn of a better day when a new structure founded on reason and enlightenment would be reared. The American Revolution and the French Revolution intensified democratic sentiments and awakened in men the hope of a real brotherhood. Revolutionary slogans aroused the latent spirit of humanitarianism in whole classes of society. Altogether apart from their value as souls to be saved, people everywhere were given a new evaluation simply because they were people. "The Rights of Man" transcended the rights of Frenchmen or Englishmen or Americans as such. They involved a new conception of humanity, which ignored color or nationality, and which swept aside all social or caste distinctions. Missionary enthusiasm was directed in part by the democratic current.

A second source of the new humanitarian impulse was Wesleyan Methodism. There was a mere handful of Methodists in the United States prior to the Revolutionary War, but by the close of the century—thanks to the indefatigability of Bishop Asbury and his staff of evangelistic lieutenants—they had become one of the four leading religious bodies in the land. Through their emphasis on the boundless love and infinite pity of God and on the doctrine of the free gift of salvation to all who will to accept it, their converts quite frequently experienced a religious ecstasy which introduced them into a totally different world from that of the Old Calvinists whose uncertain frame of mind about their election tended to make them melancholy and despondent. It was not difficult for the happy Methodist, who knew from his own joyful

exuberance that he was saved, to transfer into the channel of benevolent activity much of the superabundant energy created by his emotional explosion. A passion to save the lost was the outcome of his religious experience. There was a militancy to Methodism, partly due to its Arminian doctrines and partly to be explained by the nature of its organization, which made its proponents veritable crusaders. Their attitude was in sharp contrast to that of Old Calvinists, who opposed the use of means for the conversion of sinners. The Baptists and the Presbyterians were considerably influenced by their contacts with the Methodists, especially on the frontier. The existence of all of them as religious organizations among a westward-moving population was conditioned upon the maintenance of the Methodist type of evangelistic fervor. The spirit of Methodism was the spirit of disinterested benevolence. The highest welfare of all mankind, regardless of color or nationality, was its objective. Its contribution to the initial foreign missionary enterprise was not direct, through men and organizations, but rather through infusing its spirit into American Christendom and in arousing in all denominations a greater sense of responsibility for human beings for whom Christ died.

The third and most directly significant factor, for the purposes of our study, which entered into the humanitarian movement in America toward the close of the eighteenth century, was the changed attitude clearly manifesting itself among the adherents of Calvinism, in reference to the value of human agency in the salvation of sinners. Old Calvinism which frowned upon the employment of human means had received a severe wound through the "New Theology" of Jonathan Edwards. Edwardeanism or New Calvinism or Consistent Calvinism was further elaborated by Samuel Hopkins, an ardent admirer of Edwards. Hopkinsianism was the death-thrust delivered to the older Puritanism. In its most extreme forms it did not prove acceptable to many, but there were few Congregational ministers who were not to some degree in-

fluenced by it. In 1796 Hopkins wrote Andrew Fuller that his views were meeting with wide acceptance in America. Forty years before, he said, there were not more than four or five who embraced his sentiments, but at the time of his letter there were over a hundred. We shall need to note briefly some of the most significant ideas which Hopkins popularized.

According to Hopkins there were Old Calvinists whose doctrine of election was such that they could anticipate the damnation of their non-elect neighbors with considerable satisfaction, because the sovereignty of God would thereby be exalted; but those same worthy men were not enthusiastic in contemplating eternal misery for themselves, should God in his infinite wisdom require it. Such an attitude Hopkins labeled "inconsistent." The "Consistent Calvinist," the really true Christian, should be ready to spend his eternity in hell if God chose to send him there. Truly, it required heroism to be a "Consistent" Calvinist.

Hopkins called false the idea that love to God originates in the belief that he loves us and designs to make us happy. Such a view would exclude disinterested affection for God. Not joy of salvation, the most potent dynamic of Methodist humanitarianism, but the sterner conception of duty constituted the drive for disinterested benevolence, according to Hopkins. Like Edwards, he stressed the virtue of utter surrender of all personal interests to the benevolent purposes of God. Just as all of God's actions are directed with a view to the greatest good of "being in general," so the true believer will practise disinterested benevolence or universal goodness which has for its object "all beings which exist, capable of good." The Hopkinsian Utopia was delineated as follows:

Whenever Christianity shall spread over the whole world and the distinguishing spirit and power of it take place universally, forming men to a high degree of universal benevolence and disinterested affection, it will unite mankind into a happy family, teaching them to love one another as brethren, each one seeking and rejoicing in the public good and in the

happiness of individuals: this will form the most happy state of public society that can be enjoyed on earth.

Hopkins was an inveterate optimist in spite of his belief that the vast majority of people are lost.

Hopkins did not shrink from his conclusions. In Newport, R. I., he had abundant opportunity to apply his theory of disinterested benevolence to the victims of the slave trade which flourished there before the Revolution. Cargoes of Negroes were imported for the Southern market, and respectable church-members owned slaves. Hopkins began his attack upon the traffic and upon the institution. Some of his congregation were offended, but most of them stood loyally by him. He addressed the slaveholders of the country in 1776 in a circular which requested that the purchasing and owning of slaves be stopped. Throughout his life he was active in organizing and directing societies for the manumission of slaves.

It was Hopkins' interest in the unfortunate slave that led him to devise the first American foreign missionary enterprise. The project was formulated in a circular issued April 10, 1776, under the joint signature of Hopkins and Ezra Stiles, the latter then the pastor of another Congregational Church in Newport. Its purpose was a mission to Africa. The circular which was sent originally to various churches in Massachusetts and Connecticut received the approval of the associated ministers of several counties of Connecticut and of the New York Presbytery. There was given by the Society in Scotland £30 for propagating Christian knowledge, and over £50 was raised in New England. Two freed Negroes of Newport, Bristol Yama and John Quamine, had already been sent to Princeton to study under Witherspoon with a view to their becoming missionaries to Africa. The plan involved a colonization enterprise as well as a mission. It was rendered impracticable because of the Revolutionary War, but in 1791 Hopkins sought to renew the project and to send Yama and Salmur Nubia as missionaries to Africa. His idea was to have the abolition

societies act as missionary organizations. When he died in 1803 his missionary hopes were still awaiting fulfilment.

The direct influence of Hopkins over Samuel J. Mills, Jr., who did so much to arouse missionary enthusiasm among groups of college students and who is usually regarded as one of the pioneers of American foreign missions, although he did not himself become a foreign missionary, is easily traceable. The elder Mills was an admirer of Hopkins and a believer in the Hopkinsian theology. Hopkins corresponded with the Mills family about his African plans. The younger Mills had Africa constantly in view in his plans for an overseas mission. He died at sea in 1818 while engaged in work for the African Colonization Society. His whole life, brief though it was, was a fitting illustration of the power of an idea. Disinterested benevolence was bearing fruit in the lives of dozens of young Hopkinsians like Mills who were happy only when effacing self and in serving mankind.

The awakening of a new humanitarianism during the last quarter of the eighteenth century was accompanied by an accumulation of new knowledge about many parts of the world, hitherto unknown. The publication of books which told of the three voyages of Captain Cook in the Pacific worked wonders in stimulating the curiosity of English-speaking peoples concerning the natives of far-off lands. Men like Carey and Kicherer in perusing the pages of Captain Cook were led to ask questions about the religious state of the pagans described in these works. James Bruce in a famous journey across Abyssinia discovered the source of the Blue Nile. Mungo Park, an intrepid adventurer and medical practitioner, told a story which must have had much the same effect upon those who heard as did the later and better-known descriptions of another Scotchman, David Livingstone, upon his hearers. Park penetrated 1,500 miles into the very heart of Africa. Truly was the prophecy being fulfilled, "Many shall run to and fro, and knowledge shall be increased."

American periodical literature toward the close of the century was giving considerable attention to various customs and ideas of the heathen peoples. In 1792 a Philadelphia journal destined to have a short existence, *The Lady's Magazine and Repository of Entertaining Intelligence*, was edifying its readers with glowing accounts of strange lands and races. Among its geographical and anthropological lore might be found: "Curious Account of the Inhabitants of the Empire of Japan, their Government, Manners, and Customs"; "A Concise Account of the Empire of Hindustan"; "A Visit to the Infant Teshoo Lama"; and "The Customs and Manners of Different Nations," among which were to be found Turks, Persians, Arabians, and Hindus.

Another short-lived Philadelphia magazine, the *Monthly Review*, made its appearance in 1795. It was devoted entirely to a review of books. Among the works discussed were: Buchanan's *Travels in the Western Hebrides* from 1782 to 1790; *Asiatic Researches*, a part of which was written by Sir William Jones, the distinguished Oriental scholar; *Travels among the Kalmuks and Tatars*; and Niebuhr's *Travels through Arabia and other Countries in the East*. *The American Moral and Sentimental Magazine*, published in New York for a few months in 1797 and 1798, sought to delight its readers by means of narratives of remarkable occurrences and strange vicissitudes experienced by travelers. *The Theological Magazine* was beginning to tell, just before it suspended, of the explorations of Mungo Park. As many as sixty-three new ventures in the world of periodical literature were made during the decade from 1790 to 1800, according to William Beer's "Check List." While most of them were ephemeral, they served to direct the attention of the people who read them to the rapidly-accumulating knowledge about the world and its inhabitants.

The Theological Magazine, published in New York from 1795 to 1799, was the first American journal to give publicity

to the work of the English missionaries in India and in Otaheite (Tahiti). In its articles from English and Scotch missionary magazines, including letters from the missionaries to their friends at home, were reprinted. In one article the missionary interest of Lord Cornwallis was stressed; in another might be found the sentiments of Baron von Schirnding of Saxony, on the subject of evangelizing the heathen. Reports of the progress of the Anglican chaplains in Sierra Leone appeared side by side with discussions as to the future destiny of those heathen who had never heard the gospel. Religious enterprises were linked up with the spirit of adventure in the narration of the perilous journey of Watt and Winterbottom from Sierra Leone to the Foulah Country. It was the period of world politics, with Bonaparte in Egypt planning to cripple the British Empire, and serious people were having their interests in the larger world quickened through reading about missionaries who had gone to India, Africa, and the South Seas at a time when prudence might have prompted them to stay at home.

Again, home missions did accentuate interest in foreign missions. The New York Missionary Society was an interdenominational organization designed to promote the Christianization of the Indians on the frontier. Launched in 1796 it owed its origin and initial impulse to the birth, the year before, of the London Missionary Society. In 1798 the Congregationalists in Connecticut organized as a missionary society. The following year some Hopkinsians in Massachusetts started the Massachusetts Missionary Society. In 1802 some Baptists in Boston formed the Massachusetts Baptist Missionary Society. The significant thing about these four organizations—they were but four of many launched from 1796 to 1810—was that all published missionary magazines, three of which survived until after the birth of American foreign missions. The New York and Connecticut journals were initiated in 1800, and the two Massachusetts organs made their appearance three years later. *The New York Missionary*

Magazine was discontinued after 1803, but it was virtually superseded by the General Assembly's *Missionary Magazine* which was begun in 1805 and continued until 1809. Other prominent missionary periodicals were *The Panoplist*, the *Piscataqua Evangelical Magazine*, and the *Vermont Evangelical Magazine*. *The Panoplist* united with the Hopkinsian organ in Massachusetts in 1808 and was unquestionably the leading missionary journal of the period. Several other short-lived missionary periodicals made their appearance. It was customary for these magazines to contribute all their profits to their respective societies, to be used for missionary purposes. Of course prior to 1810 the societies were concerned entirely with local missions, although the constitutions of the two leading Massachusetts organizations made it possible for a foreign enterprise to be included if desired.

In these local missionary journals the work of the British and Dutch Missionary Societies was given the widest possible publicity. An ever-widening circle of readers was thus being reached, who were kept regularly informed concerning the progress of the new task of world evangelization. While denominationalism featured little in such a movement, it was but natural for Congregational and Presbyterian organs to emphasize the efforts of their brethren in the London Society to Christianize the natives of Otaheite, while Baptists stressed the progress of the work being undertaken in India by William Carey and his colleagues. An enlarged conception of duty was the inevitable outcome of the educational work of the missionary magazines.

Direct contacts of various sorts between people in America and some of the British missionaries during the first decade of the nineteenth century also served to awaken an interest in what they were doing. Dr. William Staughton of Philadelphia was an Englishman by birth and education. He was present in 1792 at Kettering on the occasion of the formation of the Particular Baptist Missionary Society. The following year

he came to America, and after laboring in South Carolina and New Jersey for a dozen years became pastor of the First Baptist Church of Philadelphia. Staughton was an ardent advocate of East Indian Missions and wrote a book about the work of the English Baptist Society. The chief purpose of the book, apart from its obvious contribution to the education of Americans concerning the mission, was to collect money for the British missionaries.

Robert Ralston was another Philadelphian who was interested in the Serampore mission. Ralston was an East India merchant and an elder in the Second Presbyterian Church of which Ashbel Green was pastor. He was an intimate friend of Benjamin Wickes, an American ship captain, who, in 1799 carried some of the Baptist missionaries from England to India. A few years later (1805), Wickes forwarded one thousand guineas to Ralston for safekeeping until he should make his next voyage. The money had been entrusted to Wickes by the directors of the English Baptist Missionary Society for the aid of Carey in translating the Bible into several languages of the Hindus. Wickes made the suggestion upon his arrival in Philadelphia that Americans be invited to share in the contribution. A circular letter from the ministers of Philadelphia to the clergy of other cities endorsed the plan of Wickes. The leading missionary journals gave Wickes' suggestion and the circular the widest publicity possible. The circular calling for aid for "the benighted idolaters of one-eighth of the human race" was signed by Staughton and White, the Baptist pastors, by the rector of St. Paul's, the Methodist pastor of St. George's church, four Presbyterian ministers, and several others. Committees were appointed to receive funds in New York, Boston, Portsmouth, New Haven, Newark, New Brunswick, Baltimore, Washington, Alexandria, Norfolk, Charleston, and Savannah.

Between five and six thousand dollars was raised at the time, most of it in Philadelphia and Boston. Carey and his

colleagues sent a letter addressed to the Christian congregations in the United States, which was published in the missionary magazines, thanking them for their generosity and telling them of his hopes for the future. Already Bible translations into five languages of India were under way and five other versions, including a Chinese and a Persian translation, were contemplated.

While Americans were thus rendering valuable aid to Carey's mission in India they were at the same time kept aware of the work of the London Missionary Society, through the publication in the missionary magazines of excerpts from British missionary periodicals. An account of the visit of two converted Hottentots to London, letters from Pomare, King of Otaheite, praising the missionaries and their work, descriptions of the customs and life of the "Boschemen" of South Africa, a wild race who, according to the missionary, Kicherer, had no idea of the Supreme Being and no form of worship whatever, and other items of this sort were keeping up interest in the missions of the London Society.

The program of world evangelization was calling for an extension of the field in the East. The decision of the London Society to send Robert Morrison to China had a direct influence in stimulating the interest of Americans in missions, because it was necessary for Morrison, as it had been for some of the other missionaries, to go to India by way of America. The hostile attitude of the East India Company toward all religious workers, other than its own chaplains and employees of the Anglican S. P. C. K., and its influence with the government, sufficed to prevent their sailing to India on British ships. Early in 1807 Morrison arrived in New York with two other workers of the London Society who were bound for India. The missionaries were welcomed by John M. Mason, the pastor of the Associate Reformed Church and a prominent figure in the New York Missionary Society. After a brief stay in New York the party proceeded to Philadelphia to be received by

Robert Ralston and Ashbel Green. Among the prominent Americans interested in missions who met the English missionaries, while in the country, were Captain Wickes, Gideon Blackburn, missionary to the Cherokee Indians, John H. Livingston, pastor of the Dutch Reformed Church in New York, John McKnight, one of the United Presbyterian pastors of New York, and William Rogers of the University of Pennsylvania, a prominent Baptist. Ralston secured from the Secretary of State a letter recommending Morrison's design to the American consul at Canton and asking the consul to render the missionary all the assistance he could, consistent with the interests of the United States. Further American aid was rendered Morrison after he reached China through a Mr. Milnor, a friend of Ralston's stationed at Canton, at a time when the outcome of the Chinese enterprise seemed decidedly uncertain. It is quite probable that but for American aid and encouragement the mission would have failed completely. Morrison had only the happiest memories of his relations with Americans.

It must not be supposed that because the East India Company favored the Anglican chaplains, and sought to exclude from its jurisdiction missionaries from the dissenters' societies, all chaplains endorsed the attitude of the Company toward evangelizing the natives. Claudius Buchanan and Henry Martyn were two Anglican chaplains well known in America for their missionary zeal, whose endeavors in their chosen fields challenged Americans. Buchanan's *Star in the East*, published in 1809, influenced young men to turn their thoughts to the Orient. Among those led to think more seriously about missions through reading Buchanan's book was Adoniram Judson who went with Hall and three other young men to India in 1812. Henry Martyn's career made an unusual appeal to young men in America through its resemblance in some respects to that of David Brainerd whom Martyn regarded as his ideal hero. Martyn went first to India as chaplain in 1806,

then to Persia a few years later where he died at the age of thirty-one, having worn out his life in the attempt to carry the cross to the non-Christian millions of Asia.

One other factor in the rise of the foreign missionary spirit in America needs to be noted. In missionary sermons and in literature designed to arouse enthusiasm for world evangelization the belief was usually expressed or implied that the end of the age was drawing near. Prophecies, particularly those from the apocalyptic portions of the Bible, were apparently meeting their long-delayed fulfilment in the French Revolution, the Napoleonic wars, the prevalence of skepticism, the decline of the papacy and the Turkish Empire, and the awakening of European Christendom to a new missionary activity. Wars and rumors of wars, yellow fever, *The Age of Reason*, unparalleled religious revivals, and the election of the deist Jefferson to the presidency—all these factors—together with what seemed remarkable providences in the course of the life of every normal person—served to direct the attention of serious people to “the signs of the times.” Little wonder that the obscure prophecies of Daniel and Revelation should seem to be finding their fulfilment in contemporary history. If it was God’s purpose to begin the millennium, as many believed, in 1866 there remained but a few years for the gospel to be preached to every creature. It was but natural that Americans, fast becoming conscious of their nationality, should feel the urge to assume some of the responsibility for evangelizing the world. It was fast becoming a reproach that hitherto the British and the Dutch had virtually been alone among Protestants to have a share in the fulfilment of Scripture prophecies. No one was so poor that he could not contribute his mite. The wide-spread belief in the near approach of the day of Zion’s prosperity furnished the missionary enterprise with much of its dynamic.

It is quite proper to ask in a study of this character, what relations did business interests have to the rise of the mis-

sionary spirit? Were there not East India merchants who saw in missions a golden opportunity to form new contacts with backward peoples and open up new lands to trade? Was there no mercenary side to the enterprise? The answer to these queries, so far as the particular movement we are here considering is concerned, is easy. There is not a shred of evidence to indicate that the foreign missionary spirit in America, during the two decades and more in which it was growing, prior to the organization of the American Board of Commissioners for Foreign Missions, was in any way conditioned or influenced by conscious or subconscious mercenary motives on the part of missionary promoters. The missionary spirit was simply one phase of disinterested benevolence. In fact both in England and the United States the most vigorous opposition to the efforts to evangelize native peoples came from merchants trading in India and the Pacific Islands. The British East India Company hampered and annoyed missionaries in every way possible until compelled to tolerate them after the revision of their charter by Parliament in 1813. In Hawaii the missionaries of the American Board were roundly cursed as nuisances by business interests who found that missionaries were hindrances to the exploitation of backward races. As examples, two letters from the agent of Marshall and Wildes, a Mr. Jones, stationed in the Hawaiian Islands in the interests of business, to his firm in Boston may be cited. In the first, written about a year after the missionaries arrived in Hawaii, Jones bewailed the unusual difficulties he had been encountering because of changed business conditions, and then added: "The natives are too much enlightened, they know well the value of every article; if they do not there are plenty of canting, hypocritical missionaries to inform them, even though unasked." Two years later he expressed his conviction that "Trade never will again flourish at these Islands until these missionaries from the Andover mill are recalled, they are continually telling the King and chiefs that the white-people traders are cheating and

imposing on them, consequently have depreciated the value of most articles."

Those merchants of Philadelphia and Salem and Boston who were interested in missions, so far as the writer of this article has been able to discover, were wealthy philanthropists who gave liberally to other causes which they deemed worthy, such as the foundation of the Andover Theological Seminary, The American Bible Society, and to numerous charities of various sorts. Robert Ralston, of Philadelphia, was such a philanthropist. John Norris, of Salem, was another. Norris was said to have drawn ten thousand silver dollars from the bank and nailed them up in firkins to await the day when he could devote them to foreign missions. In 1808, however, he was prevailed upon by some of his Hopkinsian friends to donate the money to the new theological seminary at Andover. Whether or not the story of the firkins is true, Norris was a friend of missions, and he did give ten thousand dollars to Andover. His widow later left the American Board a bequest of thirty thousand dollars. Instances of the philanthropic spirit of prominent business men of the period might be multiplied, but all available data concerning their benevolence clearly reveals its disinterested character. Their interest in missions may have been quickened through their business contacts with the East, but there is no reason to suppose that they expected their business interests to be advanced through the missionary enterprise.

RELIGION AND EDUCATION: AN INTEGRATION

CHARLES M. BOND

Professor of Religious Education, Bucknell University

TO LOOK at religion and at education from a common point of view and to consider them in relation to each other, is our immediate task. Can religion and education be related to each other so that a real integration is the result? If such an integration is possible, do we have a basis for religious education? We shall attempt to examine the functions of religion and education in the hope that an integration of these two sets of functions will give us the basis for a functional view of religious education.

RELIGION

There are some values in life which are so great as to defy definition which will satisfy all persons. These values have developed out of the "life-blood" experiences of men in personal-social activity. Religion is such a value. Religion probably has been defined more times and in more ways than any other great life experience, and yet we are not satisfied. The value is far greater than any statement of it. We are not attempting here a definition which will do what no other definition of religion has yet done. The studies of Müller, Tiele, Jastrow, Leuba, G. F. Moore, Hopkins, Hume, Ames, Hayden, and many others are suggested as the most helpful attempts to compile and standardize definitions of religion. Rather, we are attempting to present a point of view of religion based on its functions in our personal-social order.

From our point of view we cannot correctly speak about "*the* religious experience." Religion is not separated from the wide range of common every-day life experiences. It is rather an attitude or a group of attitudes controlling or seeking to control the entire sweep of these common experiences. In his recent article in *Religious Education*, Professor Leuba attempts

to limit religion to an exceedingly narrow field of experience. His limitation seems too arbitrary to the present writer.¹ Religion is living by means of the highest forms of control recognized by individuals in their social milieux. Its fundamental purpose is to secure the most wholesome life adjustments in accordance with forms of control which themselves are constantly mounting in the scale of values recognized. With the modern individual it begins as a social inheritance, becomes vital and articulate in the crucial situations of life, and persists in changed attitudes with which to meet new crises. Historically, religions have developed their world-views, their life-views, their rituals, and their programs more or less appropriate to the needs of the particular racial groups. Conservative tendencies have tended to retain categories developed from the experiences of earlier generations.² These categories met the need of those earlier men. But experiences have varied and needs have changed. The functional development of religions has lagged far behind the development of the biological and sociological knowledge of the men involved. Any particular religion, to be understood, must be studied as composed of all the factors already named—world-view, life-view, ritual, pragmatic programs, etc. This is particularly true if religion is to be considered a “way of life” (a handy phrase so often meaningless because it is so indefinite). When the emphasis is placed upon any one of these factors to the exclusion of the others, we have a kind of academic vivisection. Religion comes to be a truncation. As such it is a “way of death,” not a “way of life.” Such a truncated approach is both unscientific and unsatisfactory for meeting the real needs of men.

Another approach, little more satisfying, though perhaps more scientific, is that approach which seeks to find the essential residue of all religions for the purpose of laying the foundations for a world religion. Certainly we recognize

¹ See *Religious Education*, January, 1928.

² H. E. Fosdick, *The Modern Use of the Bible*, Chapter IV.

supreme values in all of the world's great living religions—values which are common to all of them. Formulations of essential unity, however, have usually been couched in formal creedal or theological terms, rather than in functional terms. Such academic statements do not satisfy religious men. Actually we live, suffer, rejoice, have needs, love, hate, and serve, as Buddhists, as Hindus, as Mohammedans, as Christians, or as Hottentots. In this study we are talking about Christianity, recognizing at the same time that many of the statements could be made with equal truth about other religions.

In its broadest terms, religion may be considered as the highest attitudes controlling life processes in personal-social experience. A more specific statement would include the following three factors as fundamental:

1. *Religion is a quest.* It is the personal-social quest for the most effective life adjustments, the most satisfactory life meanings, and the most wholesome life attitudes. The quest is a process "going on" in the light of our growing understanding of the Cosmic Reality (God).
2. *Religion is a conviction.* It is the conviction that this quest is rational, worthwhile, and achievable in cooperation with other men and with Cosmic Reality (God). [The assumption here is that God is of such nature as to be within the realm of cooperation. Deity does not, necessarily, imply the supernatural. God is not to be removed from his own natural order. We too easily confuse our ideas of "super-human" and "supernatural."]
3. *Religion is life control.* It is actual control in personal-social experience. The quest is clothed with patterns of activity and the conviction rests upon a real life program. Christians conceive the highest patterns of activity to be found in the life of Jesus of Nazareth.

Still a fourth statement of the functional view of religion as presented here may be made in the following terms:

Religion is life at its best. It involves the whole of life, personal and social, seeking adjustments and finding expression in harmony with the highest values known to the individual or the group. For Christians these values are found in the God-life, potential in every man, but supremely realized in Jesus of Nazareth.

We have already indicated the major functions of religion. They are denoted by the statements of the nature of religion. It may serve us well, however, to summarize the functions of religion in three propositions.

First: Life rises from the custom levels of existence as crucial situations are met and solved. These crises may be predominately mental, emotional, volitional, moral, ethical, personal, social, or of whatever kind. Religion functions as providing patterns of activity, quiescent or kinetic, by which the situations may be resolved. Activity here includes mental as well as motor responses; e. g., the appreciation of the good, the true, and the beautiful in persons, things, and processes. The "priestly" type of religion functions in this way as does also the "prophetic" type. The tendency of the former type, however, is to forestall and to prevent the crisis, or to cut down the number and variety of the inhibitions so that what appears to be a solution may be speedily reached.

Secondly: But life is subject to many formalizing and custom-making tendencies. A multitude of forces tend to fix standards and to preserve the status quo. Where crises which mean growth are not arising, it is the function of religion, not only to provide patterns by which crises may be resolved, but also to produce the crises. This is, of course, the "prophetic" type of religion as distinguished from the "priestly" type. A study of the religions shows that it has been the latter type which has largely dominated in each case. Consequently,

conservative tendencies have produced static or decadent religions. When religion functions to produce crises in personal-social life, growth upward follows. The stories of Jesus, of the Hebrew social prophets, as well as of practically all the founders of the great religions of the world are illustrations of this fact.

Thirdly: Religion functions to provide the necessary motivation or dynamic by which personal-social life drives ahead to achieve better adjustments. Such motivation is in the recognition of values held up as the controlling attitudes in the particular religion. Religion must produce in men convictions to which they will devote their very lives until they can go on in the same devotion to higher and finer convictions. The values involved in religion have been the greatest treasures recognized by men. When they come to be commonplace or secondary, religion changes or decays. The truly religious person will hold tenaciously to the highest and dearest values he has until he is fairly sure that the next step will carry him out of present dissatisfactions in the direction of something better. In the face of reasonable assurance of better adjustments, finer relationships, keener insights, and heartier appreciations, refusal to take the step is as destructive as the worst dogmatism.

It is the function of religion to produce the heroic. It is creative rather than preservative. It is purposive, not mechanistic. It gives a radiance to personality and to sociality in the crucial experiences of creative living.³ It provides new and ever higher values as levels of achievement. Such, in brief, are the functions of religion. We have not dealt in particular details, but in principles which we consider fundamental. Those who miss the emphasis upon particulars are asked to apply these principles to their own favorite particulars before condemning the principles too hastily.

³ This is evidently what Dr. G. A. Coe has in mind when he defines religion as the "revaluation of all values." See his *Psychology of Religion* for the development of this point of view.

EDUCATION

Of the making of definitions of education, there is no end. Education and religion run a pretty close race here. Our purpose in this writing is not the promulgation of a new definition of education, as indeed it was not our purpose to present a new definition of religion. We are trying to look at both religion and education from one point of view—the functional. Seen from a common point of view, an integration may follow normally and logically. Such an integration ought to be helpful for all of us who are interested in both religion and education.

Due to the work of Dewey, Charters, Bobbit, Coe, Bower, Wieman, and many others,⁴ we have learned to think of education in terms of life adjustments in actual experience. Following this lead, we can point out three essential steps in the development of our definition of education from the functional point of view.

First: Education is the continuing process of adjustment of persons in life situations. Every normal person is already involved in many life situations having varying degrees of cruciality. These situations must be recognized, analyzed, and defined in order that life may function satisfactorily. Here are the tension points at which any real education takes place. In this process many means are involved. These have to be employed intelligently and hence arise the problems of curricula, methods, and techniques.

Secondly: Education is a cooperative process. Teacher and pupil cooperate in the process of adjustment. Teachers do not, because they can not, make adjustments for the pupils. Neither do we usually leave pupils to stumble upon satisfactory adjustments by the trial and error method. This is true whether we think of the teacher as an individual or as the

⁴ See especially Bower, *The Curriculum of Religious Education*, and Wieman, *Religious Experience and the Scientific Method*. Dewey's *Democracy and Education*, and his *Schools of Tomorrow* are basic.

social group. The educational process demands the facing and solution of life situations by teacher and pupil together, each contributing his part to the solution. The adjustment which occurs is often quite as much in the teacher's experience as it is in the pupil's experience. It is a cooperative process.

Thirdly: The adjustments, being achieved in this continuing cooperative process must have real survival values. This means the achievement of mental power and of technical skill; but it also means the development of personality, of moral character, and of a wholesome social-ethical outlook. These constitute "ends in view" and are themselves in constant process of revaluation.

Based upon these three propositions a definition of education may be built. Such a statement would seem to be established upon functions of the process recognized by a considerable group of the "prophets of education." We venture the following definition:

Education, functionally conceived, is the cooperative process of adjustment of persons in life situations, through which adjustment the full round of survival values is sought.

Such a statement immediately raises many questions. Among these two are of first importance; viz., What is to be included in the "full round of survival values"; or, What are the aims of education? And a second question follows: By what means (curricula, methods, etc.) are these values or aims to be sought?

The aims of the educational process can best be presented in terms of a description of the kind of person we hope to have developed at the end of the process. Manifestly we shall never reach the "end of the process." We must, therefore, deal in terms of process going on—not static achievement. Such a person may be described as follows: ⁵

⁵ See the author's article in *Religious Education*, Nov., 1927, The College Department of Religious Education.

1. He will be gaining sufficient facts, skills, insights, and abilities, as well as adequate health qualities, to make him a user of his environment rather than a slave to it.
2. He will be engaged in understanding, appreciating, and using the finest inheritance of his race as a means for the enrichment of life, and at the same time he will be seeking to understand, appreciate, and use the finest inheritances of other races.⁶
3. He will be progressively inheriting tested methods for the discovery and use of facts and meanings, and at the same time he will be seeking to add to this store of tested methods.
4. He will be achieving a life perspective, a knowledge of human needs, and a scientific evaluation of his own abilities so that he may find, with a minimum of lost effort, his own vocation of whatever sort.
5. He will be seeking to develop a sane social-ethical outlook as fundamental to the discovery of a better way of life for himself and his fellow men.
6. He will be developing intelligent and constructive loyalties to the important institutions of his own social group; e. g., family, community, school, church, state, etc.⁷
7. He will be seeking to develop such a life organization, such a character, that in a choice between alternative courses of action in any group of which he may be a member, he will tend to act consistently in accordance with the highest personal-social standards he knows.

When this statement of educational aims was presented to a class of students some time ago, one of the keenest members of the group remarked, "Who then can be saved?" Certainly the statement does seem idealistic, if we are looking only at the end of the process. Aims must function in educational

⁶ See Bower, *Curriculum of Religious Education*, Chapter IV.

⁷ See G. A. Coe, *What Ails Our Youth?*

practise, and no statement of educational aims can afford to be so idealistic that educational practise is stranded far below the aim. Yet a good educational aim must constitute an ideal, or educational practise would be static. In the statement presented above, the ideal end in view is stated in terms of practical process tending toward the ideal.

RELIGIOUS EDUCATION

Manifestly, religion and education have much in common. They combine as *religious education*. Their integration can be seen very clearly when we consider the aims of education in the light of the definition of religion. If education is the cooperative process of adjustment of persons in life situations, through which adjustment the full round of survival values is sought; then it is religion that provides the attitudes and values to control the process of adjustment in the defining of the life situations. Religion, itself a quest, gives sanction and meaning to the search for useful facts, methods, and true relations. Religion is one of the most significant heritages of any racial group and must, therefore, be understood, appreciated, and used, not as a traditional shibboleth, but as a creative tool. Religion provides an essential life perspective for making vocational choices. Religion, in its highest forms at least, supplies the finest social-ethical patterns for the development of wholesome attitudes and right conduct. Close to the heart of religion is loyalty, reverence, and worship. Finally, it is religion which gives form and dynamic to character. Thus in each of the various phases of the aim of education, religion plays a most vital part. Religion is not something "added to" or "superimposed upon" education. Nor is education something to be opposed or even "just tolerated" by religion. The two are vitally and organically related. They must be integrated in practise. Such integration is religious education. It is not subject matter but purpose and function which denotes education as religious.

Religious education is education under the controls of religion. Our definition of religious education, therefore, will be based squarely upon our definition of education. We venture the following statement:

Religious education, functionally conceived, is the cooperative process of adjustment of persons in life situations, in which process religious attitudes and values control.

By our definition, it is religion at its best which provides the highest patterns of activity for the adjustment process. Religion supplies a "plus" dynamic for control in the process and thus produces a constant tendency for general education to become religious education. Manifestly, on this basis, a good bit of Sunday-school activity cannot rightly be called religious education. On the other hand, it is quite possible to find public-school activity which ought to be classed as religious education. The work of W. W. Charters in his book *The Teaching of Ideals* is an instance of the latter case.

The task of religious education comes to be the task of all education pushed to its highest levels. The kind of person which general education seeks to produce will be the kind of person which religious education tries to develop, with this difference. In religious education the very highest patterns of personal-social ethical activity are sought, the religious heritage of the race is deliberately used to "enrich and control present experience," and the cooperation of the recognized deity is consciously sought.

Religious education as the integration of religion and education when both are considered from the functional point of view, receives significant support in a review of religious history as well as the history of education. Time after time it is the religious prophet who is also the great champion of real education. And, on the other hand, the great prophetic educators have been men and women who were fundamentally

religious. One needs only to go to the story of the making of the Bible for such testimony. Such names as Wyclif, Erasmus, Tyndale, Luther, the makers of the Geneva Bible, the translators of the King James version, and the makers of the Revised versions, as well as those of the modern translators, come immediately to mind. Christianity has not taken a single step in advance to significant new positions unless scholarship has been in the van. Much testimony can be adduced to show that education has made its most telling gains when it has most nearly approximated the method of One who was called Teacher.

Consider for a moment a very modern movement which bears on our problem. The late Charles Foster Kent, Woolsey Professor of Biblical Literature at Yale University, spent the last years of his exceedingly active and useful life, launching a movement looking toward the kind of integration of religion and education proposed here. He gave his very life to the founding of the National Council on Religion in Higher Education. The outstanding work of this Council is its advocacy of "Character Education" and its very practical effort to select men and women and help finance them in their training to fill teaching and administrative positions on college and university faculties. The Fellows of this National Council take positions as deans of men and women, or as personnel counselors, or teach philosophy, psychology, social ethics, as well as Biblical literature, history of religions, and religious education. But whatever subject they teach, they are convinced that there is a gap in our modern educational practise, and that religion must fill that gap. They have espoused such aims and are functioning in such ways, that their work as deans, or personnel counselors, or professors of psychology or philosophy as well as of Biblical literature or ethics, comes to be religious education in a very real sense. The work of this National Council on Religion in Higher Education and of the men and women who have been chosen as its Fellows is one of

the most significant of the modern applications of the integration of religion and education.⁸

One hesitates to prophesy what changes will take place in our present educational organization when we begin to take seriously the integration of religion and education. Manifestly there will be adjustments all along the line. The church and the school will see their common task and will attempt to aid each other in doing it. This does not mean a church-dominated school system nor a church controlled by the school board. But it does mean a serious attempt by intelligent and serious-minded people to weld into a holy union these two fundamental data of human experience—religion and education.

⁸ See the bulletins and the *Year-Book of the National Council on Religion in Higher Education*, published by W. L. Sperry, of Harvard Theological School, and R. H. Edwards, of Cornell, dean and executive secretary respectively. Bulletins may be secured by writing Mr. Edwards at Barnes Hall, Ithaca.

A PHILOSOPHICAL SUPPORT OF MYSTICISM

Professor STEWART G. COLE

THEOLOGICAL thought is in a state of confusion today. The newer learning in the arts and sciences has weakened the stability of many of the old tenets of religion. Instead of a restatement of doctrinal ideas, a thorough-going reconstruction of the presuppositions of religious belief is pending. Few men are prepared to undertake this foundational work. The period of reckless experimentation in the arts, the sciences, and religion still prevails. Not many students feel they are equipped to pass judgment upon the findings of the inter-related researches. Some of the most popular hypotheses of the day have been weighed in the balance of critical investigation and found wanting. Schools of biology, psychology, and æsthetics abound. A flood of evidence from many very different fields of study requires more careful scrutiny before tested and assimilated patterns are at hand with which to rebuild the structure of the philosophy of religion. That few texts of commanding interest in the theological field are forthcoming today is no chance situation. Analytical inquiry in the various laboratories of human learning rather than synthetic treatment of religion is now in vogue.

One scholar has come forth from the workshop to present his critique of religion. He has surveyed the fields of the arts, the natural sciences, and philosophy; he has reworked certain materials of religious belief; and he has gathered what he believes are reliable and consistent data with which to support belief in God and the eternal way of fellowship with him. From the arts he has chosen the significance of the æsthetic experience which involves the enlistment of the whole person. From biology he has borrowed the conception of the growth of life by interactionary adjustment with environment. Science in general has led him to believe that all truth, religious or otherwise,

must be learned and proved through the exercise of the senses. Metaphysics, following the guide of mathematical physics, has contributed certain ultimate principles of reality. These findings are used to give scientific basis and absolute value to religious mysticism. *The Wrestle of Religion with Truth*, by Henry Nelson Wieman,¹ is a bold effort in the face of the new learning to substantiate the thesis that God is the most striking phenomenon in the universe and that man can achieve the full measure of life only as he relates himself in all his behavior to God. The text is a science of God by way of a strictly empirical approach, according to its author. Wieman has taken his philosophical lead from Perry, Hocking, and Whitehead of Harvard, more particularly from the last-named scholar.

Religion is proper adjustment to God. This adjustment is won by radical personal adventure with the Behavior of the universe. Religious illusion is commonplace because the majority of men make God in the image of their own desires. Others resort to dogmatism to defend lifeless theologies made dear by long usage. Only intimate and self-abandoned experience with the inherent nature of all being affords the soul the consciousness of God. This experience comes to the best type of mystic. He has thrown off the shackles of tradition and the organized habits of group endeavor. He has composed himself in expectancy of vital contact with the invisible and eternal. In such adaptation to the mystery of the universe, man is moved to an intense stimulation of sense experience. His total personality has been touched in intercourse with the boundless resources of his total environment. It is the lover's experience greatly exaggerated. In this ecstatic state nothing is cognized; to think would break the harmony and the inclusiveness of the cosmic contact. Only a condition of ineffableness is experienced. Great riches of life are "prehended." It is sense experience at its maximum of richness and vividness. In such an æsthetic moment man senses God. He holds communion

¹ The Macmillan Company, N. Y., 1927, pp. vii, 256.

with the ultimate source of all worlds. Through the channel of his sensorium, without the necessity of belief in any sixth sense, the human and divine meet, flooding man's consciousness with indescribable serenity and quickening power. Such occasions afford man the moral and spiritual undergirding by which he can go forth to help God remake the human order for righteousness and love.

Wieman anticipates the criticism of the psychologist who insinuates that, though the mystic experience is quite possible, the correct interpretation is purely subjective. That is, there are times in the life of the individual when he feels a buoyancy in the midst of his daily routine, by reason of some striking sense stimulation; but to ascribe this stimulation to "God," a cosmic phenomenon, is unwarranted inference. Certain psychologists claim that theologies are simply mythological rationalizations of religious peoples.

The author insists that religious truths must be discovered and tested by the same methods as any truth is learned. Religious experience is sense experience as is the lover's or the artist's, and it is due to the fine adjustment the individual makes to the great world goodness of space and time. This sense experience affords the student the raw material for religious knowledge, as other types of æsthetic experience provide the subject-matter for other knowledges. It is possible to have sense experience without perception or cognition. This is true in the mystic state. As men learn how to use it, however, they generate the world of their best desire, for they become a partner with the supreme good in their responsiveness to its objective stimulation.

There must be ways of apprehending sense experience which would reveal to a competent observer the presence and character of the Something upon which human life is ultimately dependent for its maximum security and abundance. When this way of apprehending becomes established as a form of habitual reaction rendered accurate through experimental tests, we perceive God.

The heart of religion is worship. Few people accomplish much in worship for want of an adequate appreciation of the rich possibilities and the searching demands wrapped up in the exercise. There are varying degrees of skill in this highest art of man. He who worships most intently has learned how to invest his complete person in the curative powers of the supreme goodness of the universe. The Bible and devotional works assist in this adjustment insofar as they expose the soul directly to God. This paves the way for self-analysis (confession of sin) and the reconstruction of the habits of life for better behavior. Prayer is not necessarily in word, as though one were talking to himself; prayer is an introductory relation to God by means of which the deepest needs of man are met in an all-sufficient communion with the infinite. Conventional worship does not produce this mystic connection between the soul and its Maker. Nothing short of a solitary venture in which the intimacies of one's heart are laid bare to its Cosmic Companion produces significant results. As one shares with a group of kindred minds in this quest, the "beloved community" has been accomplished in organized worship. But the highest rewards in mystic fellowship are not group exhibited, they are personally explored by solitary adventure. Music is not learned in a day's practise; no easier is it to acquire the art of worship. It is a life quest from day to day, and in this exercise man learns how to order the habits of his person so that they share with the supporting habits of the environing world order. Life is piecemeal and dissociated until the totality of one's experience is gathered up in adaptive relations with God. There is no technique save worship that is adequate to give a person this superior self-mastery.

Worship of this kind does not dispense with the value of auto-suggestion, though worship is more than auto-suggestion. Auto-suggestion is self-wish; worship acquires a cosmic satisfaction to the wish. There is genuine intercourse with an objective God, as in breathing there is cooperation between

lungs and air, or in walking between the muscular system and gravitation. Auto-suggestion may help a person to gain self-possession preparatory to hazardous interaction with the world that affords him his freedom and fulfilment of his deepest desires.

The doctrine of God becomes focal in Wieman's position. That God is, is as certain for the author as that man is. The only problem for the individual is to determine what God is, in order that he may learn how to relate himself to God for his most complete redemption. The object of religious quest is the inherent goodness that operates in the universe. It is not any *tertium quid* beyond man and his environment, but rather that activity within all reality that gives life value and meaning. This one has nurtured all life, kept it going and growing, and has risen to greatest expression in the human heart. It may be described in terms of beauty, but most happily as love. To the religious man it is God. He it is who is met face to face in genuine mystic experience. The senses of the individual are so stirred by his worthful presence that all organized habits of behavior disintegrate temporarily, and the worshiper renews his spiritual strength. This exquisite discovery reconditions every aspect of human personality, to correct harmful practises and to glorify each interest of the social endeavorer. Behavioristic man harmonizes his life with the beneficent Behavior of the universe in such religious intercourse.

This God the mystic discovers is identical with the one the metaphysician finds who follows the lead of the mathematical physicist. Wieman finds Whitehead's "Principle of Concretion" the key that unlocks the mystery of reality. The author's own words explain the phrase:

The principle of concretion in its common and simple form was expressed by Tennyson in his lines about the little flower in the crannied wall:

If I could understand
What you are, root and all, and all in all,
I should know what God and man is.

The principle of concretion means that everything that exists, as for example the flower, involves in its existence the totality of all being. This flower is what it is because all the rest of being is what it is. This flower has its color and size and shape and all its other qualities, and has come into existence at this particular time and place in the history of the universe, because the sun has been shining these many thousands of years and will be for thousands of years yet to come, and because of many other factors besides. Everything which is has some share in the existence of this flower. All being comes to a focus in this flower. Everything that is or ever has been or ever will be is organized about this flower in concentric circles of relevance. . . The flower "prehends" all being; the universe is "concreted" in the flower.

The philosopher who recognizes the unification of the many into one has had an æsthetic experience similar to that of the mystic when he finds himself in communion with the inherent goodness of the world. The principle of concretion and God are one and the same. It is to be noted that Wieman finds God through the æsthetic experience rather than by any categorical imperative of the moral will. The former experience is more complete than moral experience. It includes the latter as a partial feature. "It is plain that in æsthetic experience we become aware of the concrete fulness of things as we do not when dealing with the world in a purely moral or conceptual way."

This conception of God does not rest with a recognition of his cosmic immanence. Though it is true that God is "simply this one, sustaining, all-pervading character which the universe displays, the principle of concretion, the constitutive, æsthetic order of all being," in a most real sense he is also transcendent. He is not beyond the world of being as an independent phenomenon, but he is more than the world's present actual condition. He "is much more fully operative as the characteristic order of the realm of possibility." Human nature and our present human society are only transitory expressions of God's power of concretion. There is always a becoming

and oughtness at work in creation to bring forth that which hitherto was not. This creative activity of God permits of an absolute progression in cosmic and social evolution and sets up an absolute measure of religious values. Men, on lower levels of life, can promote or retard this concreting process as they relate themselves advisedly or otherwise for the focusing of all reality more fully in a community of love. This interpretation of the experience of God shows how ultimate cause and supreme good are one and related to human life.

No conception of God can be adequately established until it has come to terms with the problem of evil. Pantheism has no place in Wieman's position. There is too much tragic evil in the universe; and this evil is at odds with God. It would destroy God if it could. Fortunately, supreme goodness has an advantage in the unending conflict. "Evil cannot attack the universe as a whole." The good could exist without evil; but evil, as a parasite, must have the good upon which to live. The principle of concretion defines the good; the evil constitutes the principle of discretion or anti-concretion. It is a case of cosmos versus chaos.

The disordering principle of evil would have no being if there were no order to disrupt. Evil could never completely triumph, for in the very moment that it destroyed the concrete order it would destroy itself. It would have nothing upon which to feed, no standing ground. Evil is a parasite on the goodness of God; but God and evil are mutually exclusive.

The religious man finds the destructive cosmic force at work in him in the forms of pain, suffering, and sin. If suffering can be used to bring about a rightness of personal experience that the individual would otherwise never know, and it may be so used, then it does not share in the principle of discretion. The sufferer has changed the substance of his experience into a positive value. Only such pain as frustrates the best interests of the person throws its resources with ultimate evil. War and bloodshed are evil because they destroy

the sinews of human love and contribute to social chaos. They run counter to the "concrete" order of things. Man did not lay hold upon the potential resources of God with sufficient abandon to meet the gravity of the situation. "Evil can never be transmuted unless the sufferer himself finds in his suffering the larger fulfilment of his love or other inclusive interest." That this is not the best of possible worlds, gives God and man the necessity of struggling in alliance to make it so. They are better for the wrestle. They require contrary action to produce their finer being. Evil serves a good purpose in the universe when good transmutes it by sheer superior creativeness. Unfortunately, evil sometimes outdoes good in the conflict, and the world is the worse for the failure. Hence murder and world war.

The supreme good may actually require a great amount of suffering, not merely as means to an end, but as one necessary constituent in its actual and immediate fulfilment.

The author's treatment of the doctrine of man is not as complete as some readers would desire. Wieman is inclined to discount the service of the social sciences and to depend upon such findings as common sense and metaphysics can discover. God rises to the highest order of concretion in human life. For this reason man can "prehend" God more fully than the animal world can; the animal world more fully than the inanimate world can. There are ranges of prehension in the universe. God depends upon man more than any other factor in the universe to improve the nature of reality. Man becomes a bundle of habits through constant interactionary play with the forces that constitute his environment. He is so made that these habits can function in an ever-increasing diversity of response to the stimuli that pour in upon him. This "surplusage of responses" provides man with his unique power for venture, permitting of good and bad traits. The three cardinal sins of man are mental misery, wrong-doing, and impoverished life. These ills follow improper adjustments to

"the supreme conditions of a growing life." Unless a man finds God in the formation of his habits, he is a lost soul. The mystic state of worship reenforces his life for the defeat of bad habits, for the sublimation of wrong interests, and for the harmonizing of his set of self-controls. When the individual finds the way of love in his social groupings he has utilized another technique for enhancing his personality and reproducing the principle of concretion (God) in the world.

Wieman's description of the way man selects the content of his experience, fashions his habits, and makes his own world of meanings, is especially significant. The author uses a penny to point out what "a vast, panoramic, kaleidoscopic, massive experience" in the wide ranges of space and time can be reached by perceiving it. Light from the sun permits us to see it. The gravitation of earth allows us to locate it. Other objects in proximity give us a basis for judging its size. Our own organism and all our past experience enter into the process of interpreting the penny. "And so we could go on and on uncovering further depths and riches, immeasurable and illimitable, all pertaining to the penny." When we speak of a penny, we *select* a very limited part of this inclusive experience possible to man. Our selection is based on the grounds of our habits of experience. Each individual puts into his experience of the penny the peculiar summation of contents that have grown out of his own adaptation to life.

This study of the penny may help us to get some slight notion of how immeasurably numerous and diverse are the different worlds we might perceive if our habits were different. It shows that the world we perceive has been selected and shaped by our habits. The world in which we live is only one of many worlds in which we might have lived if our habits had been different.

We cannot perceive the world in its fullness. Every man particularizes. It is a particular type of sense experience that permits a man to see God. God can affect the human senses. This most rewarding experience is possible only to him who

has learned to organize his habits of life to permit of the largest attachment of the personality to the most inclusive nature of the environing world.

Jesus of Nazareth has done most to reveal God in human history, because he made the uttermost venture of love. He staked all his goods of earthly enterprise upon the belief that the universe would respond favorably to a personality invested in sacrificial regard for others. This love was no sentimentality, nor the venture that of a bravado; no adequate compensation would have attended that type of enlistment of life. Jesus was honestly, wisely, and fearlessly devoted to man and God throughout his entire career. He knew the secret of withdrawal from the world of confusion and of solitary meditation, when he drew upon the power divine. History is proving that his way of adjustment to the universe "sustains the maximum security and increase of human good." This is the reason Christians still cling to him above all others. Attachment to Jesus brings the experimenter into possession of vast stores of cosmic goodness. "Jesus has still much to give us that we have not yet been able to receive." Buddha, Confucius, Lao-tse, and all the stellar prophets of history bear witness to the fruitfulness of this Jesus' way of life. And the same precious object of reality that is found in the Christian's Saviour may also be scrutinized in sunsets, flowers, family circles, works of art, the face of a child, and poetry. God, the principle of concretion, superbly expressed in Jesus, is resident in every thing that portrays beauty and worth in its behavior. They who have eyes to see and ears to hear can sense God everywhere. When men engender this experience they not only enrich themselves but they also make God a little more actual in this world of his growing realization.

Doctor Wieman has much to say about modern science and its bearing upon religion.² Science and religion are not

² He treats this theme more fully in his text, *Religious Experience and Scientific Method*, Macmillan, 1926.

exclusive nor contradictory interests. "Religion must rest upon objective fact, just as much as science." Religion, benefiting by all that science has discovered, functions on the frontier of human exploration, a work that no mechanical technique can do. Sciences pursue the reliable machine way of experimentation. Religion takes great risks in a personal adventure in the ways of the universe. The scientist learns how to relate phases of his personality to limited provinces of his environment with the expectation of finding how to control certain forces in this interactionary relation with a degree of trustworthy regularity. Such controlled forces become satisfiers of human desires. The religionist meets the most inclusive and subtle demands of his person by throwing himself upon the resources of the universe, and through a process of the most intimate adjustment learns how to draw upon his world for the grace to live well.

Religion differs from other problem-solving in that it has to do with the ultimate character of events, rather than with the more superficial facts which engage the mind in other walks of life; and it requires the organization of all one's experiences, the reconstruction of that totality of reactions, which makes up the whole personality rather than some department of the personality . . . the exact sciences are quite helpless when it comes to these more complex and profound problems of human adjustment.

Science is interested in the improving of method to do its given work more and more effectively. When better ways of work are discovered the new hypotheses are substituted for the old without regret or delay. Religion, on the other hand, has always treasured its beliefs above all else and defended them against the intruder. The present-day theological controversy, displaying a medley of doctrine, is evidence that religion requires a more distinctive method and more refined concepts if it is to accomplish its high mission among men. Wieman has undertaken to articulate these two kinds of criteria in his philosophy of religion. Following Whitehead's lead, Wieman

finds support for his conception of deity in three scientific discoveries: the character of space and time, the ultimate and changeless nature of certain "abstract forms," and the recognition of "levels of prehension" in the universe.

When it comes to the subject of epistemology it is rather difficult to follow the author in every particular. Religious knowledge has two sources: sense experience and philosophical concepts. The second source reenforces the first. Religion must always resort to the proof of the senses to support its validity. Sense experience gives a man "the most practical kind of knowledge" about religion. But during the mystic state the individual perceives nothing. How, then, does he move advisedly from the strong excitation of consciousness during the religious experience to the "wisdom" that he claims rests upon it? And how does he make the nexus between practical wisdom about God and that knowledge of God which philosophy contributes? Wieman would answer the first question by claiming that though the mystic does not perceive or cognize anything, he does "sense" an Other and he does "prehend" that Other. A man does not need to know the meaning of the universe in order to live happily in adjustment to it; but he does need to prove it by an intensely practical way of living in the closest communion with it. This pragmatic test gives him direct knowledge of the nature of God. Then, "he intuitively apprehends a theory concerning that character of the world event which most critically affects the good of human life, and how best to adjust to it." The reports of such historic trials have been preserved in religious symbol and story. The author would meet the second inquiry by saying that the concepts of philosophy, helpful in understanding God, owe their genesis to man's findings in physics and mathematics. They are deduced as metaphysical truths from the laws of the exact sciences. And they can be verified in an appreciative experience of the harmony of truth with its referents in the world, as can religious belief in a mystical

experience. This gives the two types of religious knowledge their common meeting-place and their mutual reenforcement. In other words, the "principle of concretion" enunciated by the metaphysician and "God" as experienced in the great life adventure are one, and are substantiated in each case by an æsthetic understanding of the world.

The constitutive order of the universe is not the moral (annulling Kant's position) nor the conceptual (denying the trustworthiness of the speculative philosopher's approach) but the æsthetic (connoting the strenuous, practical, experimental in life). . . In æsthetic experience the concept is submerged and sometimes almost lost in the wealth of concrete experience.

Philosophy prepares a life-map for religion. It purifies and systematizes the tools of thought, captured from the arts and sciences and every-day life, and makes them available for the most advanced experimentation in religion. The conceptual patterns of philosophy include such abstract forms as the ultimate cause, the supreme good, God, the principle of concretion, love, beauty, evil, and so on. They may have truth, æsthetic, or organizing values, according to the purpose they serve in human thought. Some concepts are descriptive; others implicative. These eternal meanings, with both actual and possible content in the behavior of the universe, are symbolized in human language. Truth lies in the way of the constant clarification of symbols to make them conform in meaning to the content resident in these changeless and ultimate concepts of reality. Truth is for purposes of increasingly inclusive and happy ranges of adjustment with the wide reaches of human and extra-human environment. Religion does not have all the truth; neither does it have all the truth it needs. It must learn to fellowship more intimately with the arts, the sciences, and philosophy, in order to carry on its supreme mission. But it should never be overlooked that religion is the most radical of human ventures; that it has a passion for truth above all other human devices; and that its last court of appeal in deter-

mining the truth about life must come through sense experience in relating oneself with the world in which one lives and moves and has one's being. In such an adjustment love holds out the greatest reward.

Several questions arise in the reviewer's mind as he peruses the pages of this significant book. It is difficult to understand just how Wieman conceives a man passes from the vivid state of mystic communion to a trustworthy knowledge of God. Why does he call the objective factor in such intercourse "God"? When he does he has a rewarding religion, but the God of this religion does not serve the same purpose as did the God in the historic religions, unless it be with the modern intellectuals.³ This faith in cosmic Behavior arises out of an appreciation of the work of the natural sciences, but can never become the way of life of typical church-people. Perhaps that is in its favor as a serious philosophy of religion. Does Doctor Wieman base his belief in the inferior power of cosmic evil (inferior to the good) upon the findings of experience or upon certain deductions of philosophy? What is its genesis? Did Jesus make his great adventure in terms of the world conceived as a universe? Are the sponsors of the exact sciences, especially of astronomy, geology and biology, devoid of the element of radical faith? Does not the author write as (a) a Christian, (b) one in the Western world, and (c) one during the academic ascendancy of the theory of cosmic evolution? If so, do not these very traits make him the spokesman of a particular type of social inheritance, a type of culture entering into religion which does not receive sufficient recognition in the manual?

There are two common approaches to religion today—the "mystical" and the social. Which one a man chooses depends upon the human equation: whether he places first emphasis upon Godward or upon manward relations. Homo-centric

³ Prof. James H. Leuba clarifies this fact in his article "Changes in the Method of Religion Made Necessary by Psychology," *Religious Education*, January, 1928, p. 27.

faith leads to a critical study of those historic, economic, racial, and cultural conditions that make the human personality in large measure what it is, and to a careful scrutiny of such social ideals as can control this microcosm for better ends. "God" is one among many social values, and may have human, cosmic, or human-cosmic meaning, according to the outlook of the prophet of the people. Theistic faith, on the other hand, puts its major trust in the microcosm and develops a program of action in which the individual finds his salvation by securing an abiding life in God. This religion makes worship its primary function; the other makes human fellowship its most compelling *motif*. Each religion has its special advantages. The one gives a sense of absolute security to the soul. The other appeals to the mundane-minded individual who feels his destiny is so wrapped up with his social milieu that religion must necessarily be an experimental way of control of social forces. The reviewer asks: Should not the views be integrated for a person to live the fullest life? They could become harmonized in an adequate treatment of the mutual relations of the natural sciences, the social sciences, and historic religion, in human behavior. Though, perhaps, Doctor Wieman would insist that he has bridged the gap and presented a philosophy of religion which gives adequate recognition to both life approaches, many would disagree. There is something wonderfully fascinating about his theistic interpretation of conduct. He has brought the beneficent claims of the universe to the door of the human heart in terms of a thrilling challenge of sense experience. But, there is a serious shortcoming in his care of the soul in its human groupings. He has compelled the natural sciences to give up of their richest findings to enhance the dignity of religion. How much more rewarding would the author's philosophy of religion have been, if he had drawn also as adroitly upon the discoveries of the social sciences? Such treatment of the human factor in life would give his naturalistic religion a more vital directive and ethical passion.

SOME NOTES ON THE PARABLES

MILTON C. WESTPHAL

THE Parables of Jesus have always been of great interest to students of the Gospels, for through them the Master brought religion down from heaven to earth, and transfigured the commonplace experiences of men into glowing lessons which cannot be forgotten. Other men, before and since Jesus' time, have "spoken in parables," but those records of their utterances which remain extant are hidden away in dusty tomes which only the scholar ventures to open. The parables of Jesus still live in the thought-world of our workaday life, and can be seen to lend sacredness and worth to the meanest events of the ordinary day. Jesus is the perfecter of the parable. He combines simplicity, terseness, power, and charm in unveiling to us through the ordinary and the commonplace the hidden things of God.

In this paper we shall attempt to indicate those elements of forcefulness and power in the parabolic method of Jesus which made him the most successful teacher of all time. We do not neglect to recognize the fact that the parables owe their essential greatness to the soul in which they were conceived, and that if it is true that the parables help us to understand Jesus, it is also true that only as we know the mind of Jesus can we rightly understand the parables.

Genius in any form confronts us with a dilemma. We cannot rightly appreciate the work of genius unless we know the worker, and we cannot know the worker apart from his work. However, we are justified in seeking to discover a method in the parabolic teachings of Jesus, for all art has its technique, whether conscious or unconscious, and all artists are born, or become masters, through that creative freedom which is the ultimate reward of obedience to technique. When the obedience is natural the mastery is superb, and the work is

done with that rare simplicity whereby genius conceals technique from the untrained eye, or the untutored ear.

We acknowledge that the parables of Jesus are the work of supreme genius, and we do not presume to lay bare the source of their freedom nor the secret of their divine simplicity. We only propose to indicate, from the point of view of rhetoric, how their method serves to make them what they are, realizing that what we have to say here can never enable us to build parables like those of Jesus. Our minds do not have his genius.

For the sake of clarity we must seek to indicate by way of definition what we mean by a parable, realizing as we do so, that any definition will fall short of comprehending what a parable is as Jesus made use of it. The uses of the words in Greek and Hebrew which stand for *parable* do not give us any immediate help, for they include a great variety of figurative speech, and, broadly speaking, embrace any kind of speech that was cast into figurative or pictorial form.

In the Septuagint *παραβολή* is usually employed to translate the Hebrew *mashal*, but the Hebrew term had a wide application. It might be a similitude, an allegory, a proverb, a paradox, or even a riddle. Nor does the etymology of the Greek word *παραβολή*, which occurs not only in the Septuagint, but also appears 48 times in the Synoptic record, give us much in the way of definiteness. We all know it means, in the Greek, to place beside for the purpose of comparison, but like the Hebrew *mashal*, it covers the whole range of figurative speech.

We are further confronted with the fact that the New Testament use of the word is just as general in its scope. In Luke 4: 23 we have it applied to the proverb, "Physician, heal thyself." In Mark 7: 15 it is used of a paradox: "There is nothing from without the man, that going into him can defile him; but the things which proceed out of the man are those that defile the man." Again in Mark 4: 30 it is used in connection with the similitude about the "Mustard Seed," and in the same chapter, beginning at the thirteenth verse, we read

that "The Allegory of the Soils" is also a parable. Likewise the example, or illustrative instance, of "The Rich Fool" in Luke 12: 16 is called a parable. These citations only touch the fringe of the varied uses of the word.

Moreover, the progress of defining the *parable* as Jesus used it is further impeded by an historical problem. For we encounter many difficulties when we address ourselves to the task of determining the occasion, the exact intent, the original form and diction of any or all of the parables. One who has given any considerable attention to the study of the Synoptic problem would be prevented from hastening to place direct quotation marks around all the parables of Jesus, as the Synoptics have recorded them. It seems reasonable to venture that the parables have run the same risk as did the other utterances of Jesus in journeying down to our time through the paths of oral and then of written tradition. Certainly there was always the possibility of their being colored, altered, and reinterpreted, by those who repeated them verbally, or by those who had a hand in giving them written form. Comparative studies in the Synoptics have long since made it evident that the Master cannot be identical with the portrayals of him which the Evangelists have left us, and by the same token, we must concede that the records of his parables bear the marks of the minds and characters of their transmitters and recorders.

It is to be recognized that those who had a hand in writing and editing the Gospels were not conscious of any constraint to gather, test, and arrange their materials in keeping with certain canons of the science of biographical writing. They were primarily enthusiasts whose faith in Christ had set them aflame with missionary zeal, and their purpose was to serve as proclaimers of their gospel. Consequently they chose from those *Logia*, incidents, and facts which tradition had associated with the life and ministry of Jesus such materials as they might readily use to serve their immediate purpose. In this respect they were not unlike "gospelers" in all ages, for their interest

was pragmatic rather than historical, and the criticism they applied to their sources was subjective, in that their judgments were based primarily upon their own experiences and convictions. That which edified, that which inspired to holy living, that which afforded comfort and hope, was interesting to them, and they made the best possible use of it. On the other hand, that which was foreign to their experience, or conflicted with their convictions, they either altered or omitted, for such materials could not have appealed to them as being true.

In this connection it is noteworthy that an Evangelist's personal interests may be seen to manifest themselves in his choice of parables. The parables which Luke alone records Jülicher has aptly called *Trostparabeln*, or parables of consolation, and he points out that these parables ("The Good Samaritan," 10: 25-37; "The Petitioning Friend," 11: 5-8; "The Lost Coin," 15: 8-10; "The Lost Son," 15: 11-32, etc.) betray a tender interest in the salvation of the individual. On the other hand, those parables which Matthew alone records ("The Tares," 13: 24-30; "The Treasure Hidden in the Field," 13: 44; "The Unmerciful Servant," 18: 21-35; "The Judgment," 25: 31-46, etc.) reveal that the writer is interested in the Kingdom of Heaven as a program, as a reign of God which makes certain requirements of its citizens, and is built on certain well-defined principles. To be sure the note of individual interest may be discovered in Matthew's Gospel, and the thought of the Kingdom program for group salvation may be pointed to in some Lucan passages, but what we are saying here, is that the prominence of the *Trostparabeln* in Luke and the *Reichsparabeln* in Matthew would seem to justify our statement in the previous paragraph, namely, that it was what was interesting to the Gospel writers and met the test of their own experiences and convictions that they used.

A most interesting instance of a parable that seems to have been altered because of the personal bias of a reteller or even a recorder is to be found in the parable of "The King and

the Guests" (Matt. 22: 1-14), which we shall have occasion to refer to again in another connection. Here in verses 11-14 we have an incident (added to the parable) of which Luke gives no trace: "But when the king came in to behold the guests, he saw there a man who had not on a wedding-garment," etc. It would appear that the recorder is desirous of preventing the thought that entrance to the Kingdom is not without some conditions, and it may be that we are encountering that same Jewish-Christian attitude toward Gentile Christians which made Paul's lot so trying.

The one parable recorded by Mark which is omitted by Matthew and Luke ("The Secret Growth of the Seed," Mark 4: 26-29), might also provoke some interesting conjectures as to why the writers of the other two Gospels passed it by. It might be seen to be somewhat contradictory to the parables of the "Mustard Seed" and "The Leaven," whose lessons were dear to those early Christians, as they found in them a comforting apology for the numerical weakness of the movement with which they were so ardently identified.

If space permitted, we might pause here to parallel the Synoptic records of the parables, and to show in detail variations in respect to occasion, form, and interpretation. We could point out by quoting parallel passages: that what one Evangelist gives as a parable another records as a simile; or that elements, which to one Evangelist are most important, are to another minor and hence subordinated; or that parables which one Evangelist records as being spoken on one occasion are placed by another at an entirely different time in the Master's ministry.

Such a study would doubtless serve to increase our caution in dealing with statements recorded by the Synoptics as belonging to original parables but betraying their lack of genuineness by the foreign or even contradictory nature of the thoughts they seek to express. The parable of "The Unwilling Guests," as Matthew records it, is a case in point. This parable is

common to Matthew and Luke, but Matthew adds a sentence which has worried harmonizers, because it introduces a "spirit of revenge" which interpreters would prefer to consider foreign to the mind of Jesus. The sentence is found in Matthew 22: 7: "But the king was wroth; and he sent his armies, and destroyed those murderers, and burned their city." Evidently the Evangelist, writing after the fall of Jerusalem, cannot resist the temptation of applying this parable to the Jerusalem leaders, whom he sees punished by the Almighty for their rejection of Jesus.

Nor is the writer of Matthew the only Evangelist who felt constrained to add his own interpretation to certain of the parables which he recorded. In Luke 16: 9-12, we find the writer making a heroic effort to give the parable of "The Unrighteous Steward" an edifying interpretation. The text of this passage would seem to indicate that the Master's parable ends with the eighth verse—"For the sons of this world are for their own generation wiser than the sons of the light." Here Jesus appears simply to be pointing out to the disciples that the citizen of the Kingdom should not be lacking in foresight. The evident point of the parable is that if unrighteous men make their wisdom serve their evil purposes, how much more ought citizens of the Kingdom to exercise wisdom for righteous purposes. Luke evidently does not understand the parable clearly, and is annoyed by the fact that it seems to commend shrewd wickedness. Hence we have his effort to give an edifying turn to the parable.

These two instances suffice to show us that the parable is often imbedded in the context, and that its simplicity and directness may be concealed by the attempts of the Evangelists to make it fit in with their thoughts and their experience. Consequently, an accurate definition of the parable is dependent upon the measure of success New Testament scholarship can achieve in the difficult task of considering the parable apart from its context.

Probably the most significant attempt to define the parable in the face of the difficulties we have mentioned here has been made by Jülicher in his comprehensive work *Die Gleichnissreden Jesu*. He begins with the hypothesis that originally the parables of Jesus were markedly simple. Their object was to enforce and illustrate, and consequently, in their original form, they had no need of lengthy interpretations. With this hypothesis Jülicher sets out to rescue the parables from their interpreters, who, before the Gospel was committed to writing, and ever since that time, have dealt with the parables as if they were allegories that require divinely-led interpreters to make their meaning plain. He inclines to the view that Jesus did not seek through any one parable to teach more than a single lesson or moral, and, that in the case of longer parables, such as the parable of "The Sower," the Master intended that the lesson be taken not from individual features but from the parable as a whole. Consequently, when Jülicher wants to look at a parable in that form which is nearest its original cast, he sets aside those details in the Gospel record which tend to complicate the purpose of the parable. In all cases in which there is given along with the parable what purports to be its explanation, our investigator seeks to direct his attention to the parable itself, and considers the explanatory material to be of uncertain genuineness.

Especially in dealing with the much-disputed passage in Matthew 13: 13ff., wherein Jesus is recorded as applying to his hearers the words of Isaiah ("This people's heart is waxed gross, and their ears are dull of hearing, and their eyes they have closed . . ."), as though it were his express intention to veil his meaning from his hearers, does Jülicher concern himself with showing that Jesus could not have intended to use his parables as stumbling-blocks, for his object was not to conceal his thoughts but rather to make them clear to the simplest mind among his hearers. In the thought of Jülicher this paragraph on the object of teaching by parables is not to be regarded

as an authentic record of words coming from the Master's lips, but rather as embodying conclusions of the later Church. The Jews had indeed shown themselves blind and deaf. To the disciples, as they looked back to the rejection of Christ, this teaching appeared to justify them in leaving the faithless as they were. The Evangelist is, therefore, pronouncing a verdict arrived at by the early Church.

Carrying his hypothesis through fearlessly and with force of conviction Jülicher arrives at the following general conclusion, which we do not attempt here to defend, but which, for the practical purpose of arriving at a working definition, we utilize. First, those sections containing interpretations of parables, as well as all recorded allusions to such interpretations, must be discounted if we are to look at the parables in their most original form. Second, the passages which set forth the theory that the teaching of the parables was intended to be esoteric are to be regarded as being of later origin than the parables themselves. Third, all those statements which, if considered authentic, would convert certain of the parables into allegories, must also be left out of our consideration.

On the basis of these general conclusions, Jülicher divides the Synoptic parables into three classes. In the first class he places what he calls *Gleichnisse*, or undeveloped parables, in which one thing is simply compared with another. Probably our best English word to use as a translation of his term is *similitude*. Such are "The Fig-tree as Harbinger," "The Lamp on the Stand," "The Physician and the Sick," "The Eagles and the Carcass," and twenty-four others of a similar type. In the second group he places what he terms *Parabeln*. These are narrative-parables in which the comparison is worked out in the form of a story. Such are "The Building on the Rock and on the Sand," "The Widow and the Unjust Judge," "The Lost Son," and eighteen others. In his last list he places four typical stories, or *Beispiele Erzählungen*, in which some principle or other is illustrated by means of a concrete example.

These are "The Good Samaritan," "The Pharisee and the Publican," "The Rich Fool," and "Dives and Lazarus."

After this somewhat lengthy consideration of Jülicher's contribution to our problem, let us say for practical purposes that the parable, as Jesus made use of it, is a brief, sententious form of discourse, complete in itself, and based upon a comparison between some real fact or event in nature or in human experience and a spiritual principle or truth; second, that the form of comparison with which it has to do may follow one of several rhetorical types; and third, that its object is to convey openly and simply to the hearer a single spiritual lesson.

With this definition, which is confessedly loose as well as arbitrary, let us address ourselves to the comparisons of Jesus with the intent of detecting, if possible, something of the Master's method, in the hope that those qualities of power, simplicity, and charm, which ever characterize the parables of Jesus, may be seen to result, in part at least, from that method.

The superb naturalness of the parables of Jesus doubtless represents to the reader their most compelling quality. The Master never distorts facts in order to impress the truths he is seeking to convey, nor does he ever indulge in impossible imaginings. The nature which we see in his parables is never dissimilar to the nature we are privileged to know. Likewise, the human beings whom we watch playing their parts to illustrate his teachings, are quite as normal as we ourselves. In his metaphors the course of action is not unlike the corresponding action of nature or human nature in the daily experiences of life. And herein lies one secret of the Master's teaching power—his spiritual truths and ethical principles press in upon us from the every-day phenomena of nature and human life. As a consequence, we do not find it necessary to dissipate our mental energies in order to understand a difficult and unnatural illustration. Our attention is swiftly transferred from the figure he uses to the spiritual sense of its comparison where the forcefulness of the lesson impresses us without pause.

In this respect Jesus may be seen to pursue a more effective method than do many of the Old Testament writers. While Jeremiah (12: 13) does not hesitate to make men reap thorns from sown wheat, Jesus accounts for the presence of the tares (Matt. 13: 25) by having an enemy sow them. The tree of which Nebuchadnezzar dreams (Dan. 4: 10ff.) is of a highly imaginative type, with its growth reaching to heaven and its branches extending to the ends of the earth. Likewise the tree which Ezekiel describes (17: 22ff.) is a marvelous affair which grows from a tender twig that has been cropped from the top of a cedar and planted on a mountain peak. But the trees of which Jesus speaks in his parables are the kind that one can look upon anywhere in his native country. They take on no impossible proportions, nor do they spring forth to growth in miraculous ways. As Jülicher has stated (*op. cit.*, Bk. I, p. 165), these ancient writers lacked that charming naïveté which has given to the parables of Jesus their naturalness and simplicity.

Wherever we turn in the Gospel record, the parables captivate us with their charming naturalness. We see pearl merchants plying their trade, agents falsifying their accounts, shepherds separating their sheep from the goats, a woman hunting for a lost coin, men hesitating to cut down trees that have not borne, stealthy enemies sowing tares in a man's field, and men buying fields for the sake of their concealed treasure-boxes. So faithful has Jesus been to the contemporary facts of his life and day, that scholars have found his parables to contain many valuable clues to first-century habits and customs among the Jews.

Some one might point out that Jesus does, on occasion, use the impossible as a basis for his figures, as for instance, "Ye strain out the gnat and swallow the camel," or the parable of "The Beam and the Mote." But it may be said in reply that when such instances occur in the Gospel record, the Master may be found to be using proverbial expressions current in

his day, or, in the case of the parable of "The Beam and the Mote,"¹ he may be indulging in a bit of humor. When, in Luke 18: 25, he says that a camel can pass through the eye of a needle easier than a rich man can enter into the Kingdom, he is simply emphasizing, by means of an ancient oriental proverb, that the rich man is decidedly handicapped.

Jesus arrives at the full advantage of his naturalness in those parables which aim to set forth the love, the goodness, and the forgiveness of God. The most revealing and most comforting of his parables are built about the natural figure of human fatherhood. It is because we can understand how a human father would forgive a prodigal son that Jesus is able to make us feel the certainty of God's pardon for our confessed sins. Similarly, it is because we know that even wicked men would have to violate greatly their fatherly instincts to give their children serpents instead of fish, or stones instead of bread, that we can find in the Master's parable the assurance of God's goodness.

These illustrations ought to suffice to make plain to us that the first element of power in the parabolic method of Jesus is his choice of natural comparisons in preference to those distorted and unreal figures of speech which we find elsewhere in the Scriptures, to say nothing of the apocryphal and rabbinical writings.

But when we have called the parables of Jesus natural, we have not precluded the possibility of their being also often radical in their metaphors, for even a cursory study of the parables should bring one to the realization that Jesus often enforces a truth or a principle by comparing it with some object, action, or relation which is the most radical of its class. When he desires to set forth what great possibilities of growth there are in incipient faith, he chooses the most minute of seeds (Luke 17: 6; Matt. 13: 31) known to his hearers, which, in the process

¹ See George B. King, *The Mote and the Beam*, *Harvard Theological Review*. Vol. XVII, No. 4, (Oct., 1924), pp. 393-404.

of its growth, becomes a veritable tree. Again, when he wishes to use the figure of a net filled with every kind of fish (Matt. 13: 47), he chooses a drag-net, that it may scrape along the very bottom. When he speaks of the vultures, in the parable of "The Eagles and the Carcass," he may perchance be conscious of using the same figure that Habakkuk uses (1:8), who speaks of "an eagle that hasteth to devour," or, that Job uses (39: 30) when he speaks of the hawk being present where the slain are found, or again, that Ezekiel uses (39: 17) when he summons the birds and beasts to drink the blood at the slaughter, but he manifests his skill as a master of the parable by drawing his picture with one swift, radical stroke, and makes us see the vultures just settling upon the corpse (Luke 17: 37). Here he has chosen the most horrifying moment of action, and, by his radical choice, has driven home his thought.

It is certainly radical to conceive of one lopping off a hand or a foot, or of gouging out an eye to save the rest of the body from offense, but Jesus shows his mastery in making so radical an act of self-mutilation the basis of a comparison which should startle men into recognizing the spiritual necessity of lopping off what stands in the way of Kingdom perfection (Matt. 5: 29; 18: 8, 9).

In parables dealing with social incidents as a basis of comparison, Jesus shows a decidedly radical policy. The parable of "The Children and the Dogs" is a case in point. Here Jesus compares children with animal scavengers in his conversation with the Syro-Phœnician woman. Some interpreters have had great difficulty to explain away the apparent brutality of this parable, for being "Apostles of Gentleness," they are offended by its radical comparison.

Instances of the Master's frequent choice of radical metaphors to make his parables striking and effective may be multiplied. To show a servant who was forgiven of an indebtedness of \$100,000 casting a fellow-servant into prison for an indebtedness of \$17.00, certainly sets the ingrate in relief. To

depict a man selling all that he possesses in order to buy a pearl or a field containing a treasure-box, is a striking way of showing that the pearl or the field is valued highly by the purchaser. To use a mill-stone and death by drowning as a punishment for offending "one of these little ones" is magnifying such a sin to an unusual degree.

Perhaps the most highly wrought of all the parables is the one concerning Dives and Lazarus. Here the sumptuous fare and the fine outer and inner garments of Dives are set in sharp contrast with the extreme suffering of Lazarus, lying at the gate, covered with ulcers licked by the dogs, and feeding on what fell from the rich man's table. Nor is the last part of the parable of less intensity, when Abraham's Bosom is set over against hell, with the yawning gulf between.

The significant fact in connection with this use of radical figures to produce his desired effects is that at no time does Jesus sacrifice naturalness for the sake of intensity. Like an effective landscape artist, who can use high colors without doing violence to the scene he is painting, so Jesus succeeds in being natural and emphatic at the same time.

A third element of power in the parabolic method of Jesus is to be discovered in noting how effectively he excludes all non-contributing details from his comparisons. Here again we detect the greatness of his mastery. He never allows his fancy free play, much less does he permit the poetry of a thing, with its temptations to adornment, to run away with him. He keeps the poetry of his soul subservient to his prophetic purpose. His parables move in a straight line. They do not lose their force in flourishes. They strike the objects at which they are aimed a telling blow because Jesus never let anything come into them for its own sake or on its own account. When we consider the great wealth of Old Testament imagery in which the prophets were wont to dress their messages, we marvel that Jesus never permitted the elaborate style of an Isaiah or an Ezekiel to lend grandeur to his utterances. Contrary to

the method of the prophets, who were certainly his teachers, Jesus makes his metaphors suggest the largest amount of appropriate detail in the fewest possible words.

Let us illustrate our point by looking at the parable of "The Lost Sheep." Ezekiel 34: 11 introduces a passage which is spread out through twenty verses, in which the prophet develops at length the thought of the eleventh verse, "For thus saith the Lord Jehovah: behold I myself, even I, will search for my sheep, and will seek them out." But Ezekiel makes the mistake of dissipating the interest of the reader by bringing into the passage practically the whole range of shepherd life. He includes water-courses, mountains, fat pasture-land, inhabited places, sheep, rams, he-goats, fat sheep, lean sheep, diseased sheep, butting sheep, clear water, and befouled water, etc. Who could readily keep such a passage in mind or retain without effort the moral truths the prophet expects to convey? The Master's parable, on the other hand, is terse and direct, for out of all the imagery of Ezekiel he selects the rescue of a single sheep. He depicts the shepherd as going straight after that sheep, finding it and bringing it back to rejoice with those neighbors who have been interested in his quest. The result is that the whole Christian world can repeat from memory the parable of Jesus, because it moves in a straight line and exerts a mighty power arising from the exclusion of every non-contributing detail.

The parable of "The Talents" is another case in point. It drives home the truth that equal faithfulness in the use of unequal opportunities will be equally rewarded, and makes us feel the great force of that truth, because the parable is direct and businesslike in its movement. Likewise, the terse statement that a house divided against itself cannot stand leaves to the imagination of the hearers the task of considering the many pursuits of sin which spell destruction. Jesus does not pause to point out how liars will lie to one another, or how murderers will kill one another, or how thieves will steal from

one another. He refuses to lessen the force of his parable by illustrating at length how evil wars against itself and therefore tends to disintegrate.

Beside the method of verbal omission, the Master achieves his purpose of driving home his lesson with power, by placing such emphasis upon the significant phrases of his utterances that his hearers automatically eliminate from their attention the inapplicable particulars and fasten their eyes upon the point of the parable. Possibly the crowning illustration of this method of forced mental elimination by means of emphasis is the parable of "The Unrighteous Steward." Those who heard Jesus tell the story of a wasteful agent who squandered his Master's means, and who, when he knew he was to lose his post because his Master accused him of dishonesty, craftily bargained for the favor of his Master's debtors, could never for a moment consider that these details of his wickedness were designed to teach an ethical lesson. They were forced, by the very method of Jesus, to dwell upon the lesson of foresight and preparedness.

Likewise, the two parables of "The Petitioning Friend" (Luke 11: 5-8) and "The Insistent Widow" (Luke 18: 1-8) are instances of how Jesus could focus the attention of his hearers upon the point of the illustration he was giving (namely, the effectiveness of importunity), so that they automatically eliminated from their minds such details as the freely-confessed irreligion of the obdurate judge, or the apparent unfriendliness of the friend called upon for help at midnight. As Jülicher has said (*op. cit.*, Bk. I, p. 163),

Indeed, if God were to be seen revealed in the person of the judge, or if we Christians were to regard the Unrighteous Steward as an example to be followed, then the moral effect of the Master's parables would be decidedly unpedagogical.

But Jesus has secured the lesson of such parables as these by the able way in which he forces the insignificant details into the background of the hearer's mind.

With these three brief indications of the Master's method we must pause, because the scope of this paper is necessarily limited. We might go on to point out how Jesus achieved his pedagogical purposes by the effective use of antithesis, of deferred applications, or by reversing the significance of previous figurative uses of metaphors, but in the elements of naturalness, radicalness, and terseness we have ample illustration of the fact that Jesus had his own method of speaking in parables. By means of this method he made the best possible use of figurative speech, and gained for all time the unassailable title of "The Master Teacher."

And now, just two observations, which appear to be resultant from the cursory study we have attempted in this paper:

In the first place, although we have done nothing with the many variations in the parabolic utterances of Jesus, which Jülicher has pointed out in comparing the parallel passages of the Synoptics, if we were to address ourselves to the task of determining, if possible, which of two or more versions of a parable could be judged to be nearest the original utterance of Jesus, we might find a canon of judgment in the point of this paper; namely, that forcefulness was the supreme object and the supreme accomplishment of the Master's use of the parables; and consequently that version of a parable which delivers its blow with the greatest strength might be judged nearest the original utterance.

In the second place, we are impressed with the fact that the main feature of originality to be discovered in the Master's use of parables is not in the material he used upon which to base his comparisons, nor always in the lessons he sought to teach, but rather in the marvelously effective method with which he used the material, making the lessons stand out in bold relief, so that men cannot forget them,

THE STORY OF THE CHRISTIAN CHURCH

Professor R. E. E. HARKNESS

AGAIN the seemingly impossible has been done—a history of the Christian church has been written in one volume.¹ And it may be remarked that though the title of the book is *Christianity, Past and Present*, the work is really a history of the Christian church, its development into the Roman Catholic order, the division caused by the rise of the Protestant groups, and the present state of Christianity as it may be discovered within the two branches of the church.

One is attracted to the book by the evident desire of the author to be thoroughly scientific and the large measure of success which has attended his efforts. He is aware of the fact, not only that church history in the past has too often been written from the religious view-point and interest of the historian but also that the writer of purely scientific concern finds his way to the study of objective facts too often barred by such obstacles as “hereditary prejudices,” religious or social attitudes, fear of controversy and the necessity of careful and prolonged research for substantiating proof of his convictions. However, “the critical study of the beginnings of Christianity and evolution of the church has now reached its proper place in the science of history,” and to that task he sets himself.

It is difficult, he finds, to formulate a definition of religion which may be adequately applied to all religions. This, in fact, is not the “peculiar province of historical research.” Rather it is for the historian to seek “an exact analysis of each religion, and a comparison of it with the previous or contemporary beliefs and practices which may have affected it.” Such an analysis discloses that no religion is a homogeneity, but is a product of its own *milieu*, gathering to itself as “heirlooms” a medley of social and religious rites, beliefs and

¹ *Christianity, Past and Present*, Charles Guinebert.

customs. Thus, no religion falls "ready-made from heaven" but, contrariwise,

is born of some special initiative or of some general need; then . . . it organizes itself and nourishes itself by what it imbibes from the various religious spheres in which it is induced to live.

But when the author deals with the primitive origins of Christianity as they relate themselves directly to the life and teaching of Jesus, he neglects these facts. In his outline of those forces of the Roman world that gave direction and form to the later expansion and development of Christianity he has revealed not only a candid scientific spirit but also a wealth of knowledge and understanding of the creative human interests and values operative in that ancient society. But if the institutions, culture, and religious forms of that Gentile order affected the stream of Christianity that quietly flowed into it, why may they not have affected it at the fountainhead? Did that environing Greek world merely constitute "an almost inexhaustible reserve" for the determination of "the future of Christianity"? In such words the author proves the truth of his own statement that at least one weight upon the mind of the would-be scientist may be "hereditary prejudices." For when M. Guignebert seeks the source of the message of Jesus he is obliged to discover it almost wholly within the supernatural realm.

True, Jesus moves within his own milieu which is Jewish and which has been shaped by its political, social, and religious heritages—of which the most important is the Messianic Hope—and the contemporary imperial order. But, "Christ himself was, to all appearances, exclusively molded in the Jewish milieu." It is from this source Jesus inherited the hope of the Messianic reign and the conception of the Kingdom of Heaven. But why, asks the author, should he say that this Kingdom of Heaven is now at hand, about to be established? "He said it," he answers, "because he was urged thereto by a secret force, because he felt the Lord within him, as had all the inspired

Jewish prophets." In that sentence M. Guignebert fails his scientific method. It is the word "inspired" that leads to trouble. One cannot escape the feeling in reading this opening chapter on "Jesus' Initiative" that "inspiration" is of divine origin and that only the phrase and imagery in which the message is framed is due to the milieu. So Jesus to the author was the "inspired Galilean"; and he may therefore speak in his introduction of the "essence" of Christianity, which has passed down through the ages of Christian evolution.

But in point of fact, the Jewish did not comprise the totality of Jesus' milieu. The Jewish was confined within the larger Græco-Roman which Jesus could not possibly escape in his homeland of Galilee. And a candid survey of all facts would indicate that it is the inter-relation of these two that gave Jesus both his inspiration and content of message. For it is the political and economic burden of that empire denying the ancient hope of their own theocratic kingdom which in the days of Jesus crushed Judaism into despair and forced it to call "at the top of its throat, for the Messiah," and yet it was the social values of that same empire which gave rise to the enthusiastic conviction that the consummation of Israel's hope was at hand.

The limits of this paper do not permit an adequate elaboration of such a statement. Yet it may be noted, first, that Jesus himself was of the dispossessed and oppressed class. He had in actuality borne the grief and carried the sorrow of his people, and it was this experience and compassion for them that made him their messenger. He did not so much go to them with a message of relief as he gave voice to their needs and desires. His gospel was wrought out of their very distress and poverty of body and soul. And it is significant that, contrary to all other acclaimed Messiahs—save John the Baptist—he did not propose a military revolution but opposed such. Others had led their people as sheep to the slaughter. Not so the Man of Nazareth. He saw the terrible folly of the appeal

to arms, learned perhaps in former tragic experiences of his Galilean brethren. The sword uplifted would slay its own wielder. Moreover, Rome was accepted by him. Her very existence was an expression of the will of God. Salvation, redemption, relief lay in the quiet acceptance of that will. "Be still, and know that I am God." Wait for God to act. Be not overwrought, anxious, asserting self. God is supervising all. He will bring in the kingdom—when or how man may not know.

And in the second place, paradoxical as it may seem, the new social conditions prevailing within and because of the imperial system contributed to the rise of that optimistic faith in God's early appearance. Is it mere accident, or a divine ordering, that the Glad Tidings of John and Jesus should have been preached at a period some fifty years after the firm establishment of the empire? That empire was a unity, it brought universal peace to the world, and without doubt, the beneficent reign of the one paternal ruler helped men to attain the conception of the one God and Father of all. Rejoicing in the material and spiritual blessings that had come to men, Roman writers declared the glorious new age had dawned. *Their* kingdom of righteousness had come.

Could the Jews escape the effect of that influence? The very fact that Jesus portrayed a new kingdom—spiritual rather than political or military—and that he tacitly accepted Rome, would indicate that he, at least, though perhaps unconsciously, found kingdom values in that political-social order. The gospel was for him the expression of a present reality. Jesus was of Galilee and was thereby brought into intimate touch with Gentile folk in some of whom he found a faith greater than that among his own. The kingdom was at hand because its glorious effects could already be felt as the summer is known to be near by the balmy breezes and kindly sunshine of the springtime. And the signs of that coming kingdom for Jesus were not the apocryphal wars and rumors of wars of the Gospel writers following 70 A. D., but were the manifold indications

of good-will, friendliness, understanding, and worthy virtues among men of all races. That imperial order with its universal peace, its interchange of cultures, its vast system of trade and commerce, its measure of prosperity, but especially its interrelation of races and growing fellowship of distinct peoples, its partial construction of a common language as a medium for the expression of ideas and ideals had already brought upon earth certain values heretofore accorded to the kingdom of God.

Thus the writers of the early New Testament narratives could put this gospel of good news into the mouth of Jesus, and could believe it true, for they themselves had also experienced it. Peter, coming to *know* the centurion, much to his own astonishment found him to be a brother and a child of God. Paul, a Jew of the dispersion, could, the first of his brother apostles, fellowship the Gentiles. So likewise it is significant that it was the Hellenistic Jew who welcomed the gospel and understood the message and spirit of the Master. Verily the kingdom was in their midst.

Such a view does not *explain* Jesus. That still lies beyond the power of man. But it does suggest those factors of the social conditions that may help us to understand both the inspiration and timeliness of his message. There are many other pious young Jews, it must be admitted, to be found in the Galilean milieu of that first quarter century, but he alone seems to be "endowed (to use the author's phrase) with that singularly marvelous faculty of mustering within himself thoughts which are floating in the air he breathes and recreating them, as it were, by his meditation upon them"—thoughts, however, which come floating in upon him, not only from the field of Jewish lore and life, but also from the larger, enveloping fields of Gentile good-will and fellowship. He was sensitive to the impress of these human social influences and his own joyous spirit responded happily to them. The fact of that peculiar, personal faculty and equipment cannot be denied him, but that does not alter the other fact that the inspiration and message

of Jesus came to him from the life of his people from whence comes the message of every great prophet and saviour of men.

Nor does this view intimate that Jesus had any Messianic consciousness or that he felt certain within himself as to when or how the ancient Jewish hope would be consummated. It was sufficient for him that there were abundant signs among men that God was bringing in that Kingdom of Good-will.

But if the reader is inclined to question the thoroughness of the scientific treatment accorded the person and teaching of Jesus, it is with profound admiration and appreciation that he follows the author in his critical unfolding of influences contributing to the expansion of Christianity through the ensuing centuries. One is introduced into a wealth of information concerning that ancient world. Its age-old culture, its ingrained habits and customs, its religious beliefs and practises, the steady movement toward a "syncretism," due to the intermingling of people and the natural pressure of general current events, present the field into which Christianity with its "Hellenizing" of Jesus easily entered but conquered only by being conquered. For "the entire Græco-Roman way of living is still there underneath an appearance of Christianity, and goes on side by side with the ideal"—it is a "triumph in appearance only" for though "the church has become a governing power," she has become so only by "compromise and concession" and is now but "one of the different aspects of the Roman State; with its machinery and its gifts of administration, its insistence upon order and regularity" and even its "dread of too original and enthusiastic individuals." Thus is Christianity sacrificed in the triumph of the victorious church.

The fall of the empire and the invasions of the barbarians laid upon the church the gigantic task of disciplining these uncultured masses and welding them into some form of order, but in the process, by the very urgency of the enterprise, formal adaptations took the place of spiritual transformations. Sincere and heroic as was her attempt, again Christianity suffered

in the growth of penance and indulgences and the strengthening of the Papacy.

Nowhere, perhaps, is the author more incisive than in his exposition of the Protestant Reformation. No leader of that period revealed an attitude or method such as is known today as the historical approach. Consequently, "the Protestants never went so far as to emancipate themselves entirely from the traditions which they ought logically to have rejected." In the distinctively religious field, though "the Reformers in all good faith aimed at the restoration of authentic Christianity," all they actually accomplished "was to put together doctrinal systems more or less novel, of the kind demanded by the men whose religious aspirations they personified." Nor was there any gain in political or social freedom for it but resulted in "the transfer of religious authority from the church into the hands of secular rulers." In fact, for the common people there was no gain in freedom, either political or religious, for "it became a strict duty for subjects to think and believe as did the king on religious questions."

The Reformation failed therefore of that high achievement reasonably expected of it, by the "simple-minded" especially; and it failed largely because its leaders, though intellectuals, were not humanists characterized by the free spirit of criticism and inquiry. Therefore they remained under the dead-weight of authority.

Perhaps in his analysis of the Reformation we may most clearly see M. Guignebert's purpose in writing his history. We have said that rather than being a history of Christianity it is a history of the church. For though he carries his survey down to the present he is seeking to show how Christianity lost its free spirit in the institutionalizing of the church, so that in many quarters Christianity has become synonymous with Roman Catholicism and even among Protestants it has become almost completely identified with the church. To such an extent does he feel this to be true, the author is willing to

affirm that his book justifies the assertion that "The Western peoples have, strictly speaking, never been Christians." And so, though it reveals less specialized knowledge of the modern field than of the ancient, this is a book that should be read by all who wish to see how Christianity in doctrines and in form has developed from the simplicity and naturalness of Jesus into its present-day complexities of organization and belief.

•It may do us all good to learn that these doctrines and creeds which have never been understood, but have been such a prolific source of controversy and bloodshed even unto this day, are after all largely accretions from the pagan world upon that simple gospel of the lowly Nazarene.

WHO'S WHO IN THIS ISSUE

It is an especial pleasure to THE QUARTERLY to welcome among its contributors in this issue Frederick Tracy, B. A., Ph. D., LL. D., who is Professor of Ethics in The University of Toronto. His B. A. was taken at the University of Toronto, the Ph. D. at Clark University, under Stanley Hall, and the LL. D. was bestowed *honoris causa* by MacMaster University. He is the author of *The Psychology of Childhood*, *The Psychology of Adolescence*, *The Teacher and the School*, etc. His article is of exceeding value.

OLIVER WENDELL ELSBREE, graduate of Crozer Seminary with B. D. in 1918 and Th. M., 1919. Student in Columbia University where he received the degree of A. M. in 1923. He taught in Keystone Academy, 1919-1921, and the Peddie School, 1921-1925. Pursuing graduate studies in Columbia University, 1925-1926, he is now Associate Professor of History in Bucknell University.

CHARLES M. BOND, who presents a paper on "Religion and Education: An Integration," is an A. B., Colgate University, 1917 (Phi Beta Kappa), B. D., Crozer Seminary, 1921, and M. A., University of Pennsylvania, 1921. He has had five Quarters of residence work at the University of Chicago Divinity School in candidacy for the Ph. D. degree; and is a Fellow of the National Council on Religion in Higher Education since 1923. In addition to this academic record he has had practical experience as pastor of the Baptist Tabernacle, Wilkes-Barre, Pa., and as Interchurch University Student Pastor, Ohio University, Athens, Ohio. At present he is Professor of Religious Education, Bucknell University, Lewisburg, Pa. Mr. Bond presents an interesting thesis in the synthesis of education and religion which is well worth while.

PROFESSOR STEWART G. COLE of the Faculty is well known and will be enjoyed in his presentation this quarter.

THE REVEREND MILTON C. WESTPHAL, who offers an article on the Parables of Jesus, is an A. B. and M. A. of Cornell University, and was graduated by Rochester Theological Seminary a B. D. He has had a pastor's experience in Pittsburgh and at Lansdowne, Pa., where he now resides.

PROFESSOR R. E. E. HARKNESS, in his first year as member of the Faculty, will be remembered for his Matriculation Address in the October, 1927, number, and by his book reviews since.

NOTES AND CURRENT DISCUSSIONS

By SPENSER B. MEESER

JOSEPH FORT NEWTON, in a recent number of *The Forum*, has rendered a serious service to many of us, by an article on "Thomas Jefferson and the Religion of America."

For multitudes Jefferson is still

branded as a skeptic, an infidel, an atheist—all because he held that every man should have the right to hold and advocate such religious faith as seemed to him true, right, and good.

The historic situation brings into the light the significance of this claim, and the motive of branding him with opprobrious epithets. He fought and won the fight for religious independence. An autocratic church, he saw, could not be made to consist with a democratic state. At least there must be complete separation of Church and State.

These facts cannot fail to be of interest: Jefferson was brought up in the Church, was a vestryman in its service, and an attendant on its offices. He *was* a liberal, and his thinking was colored by the philosophy of the century. But he held his liberal faith in a liberal spirit. In what Jefferson calls "a wee little book" on *The Philosophy of Jesus* he refers to Jesus' teachings as "A more beautiful and precious morsel of ethics I have never seen."

Doctor Newton insists that to Jefferson "more than to any other one individual we owe the religious democracy of America"; something to be held sacred and not violated.

Doctor Newton makes these facts the basis of a plea for something more than toleration in religion, which is not enough. We need insight, understanding, appreciation, cooperation, "if freedom of faith is to bear its finest fruit."

For always in the creative character of religion experience new faiths arise and are bound to arise, for they imply

new visions of God and the value of personal relations to him. Here is the fact of the immediate accessibility of God to each soul. That doctrine of the immediate accessibility of God to every soul alike is the Magna Charta of democracy, in religion as in politics; in politics as in religion. It is a vanity for any sect or "church" to imagine or claim its adherents have special value or access to God and knowledge of Him.

S. B. M.

A PERMANENT and serious challenge is put to all Protestant preachers in an article in *The Atlantic* for December, 1927, entitled "Shall We Send Our Children to Church?" by M'Cready Sykes. He insists that there are families of intelligent men and women whose children are not being sent to church in anything like the proportion that children in families of that sort were sent, say a generation ago. Deploring this fact, Mr. Sykes essays to give some explanation. He supposes this unwillingness of parents is not indisposition to have their children attend the "house of God," but a doubt whether the church may always fairly be described as such, or the pulpit utterances as inspired of God. He cites these reasons for the doubt: The lack of confidence that the church is not sometimes flouting "the obligations of intellectual integrity"; and the conviction that the minister's appeal will not touch the children unless it thoroughly and whole-heartedly "makes its pronouncements square with the requirements of reason and intelligence."

It is not such matters as those of dogmatic theology that offend. Bad as they may be conceived to be,

the disquieting feature is that men who by intensive education should be best qualified to speak with authority should pervert their office to presentation of arguments unworthy of a schoolboy.

The spokesmen of the church, it is asserted, do not meet their congregations with intellectual integrity, and the author

says that "We should be shocked to have our children follow along their path."

"The fundamental appeal of Christianity is as a way of life—the spiritual interpretation of the universe in the light of a great personality." This appeal is perpetual in freshness and vitality. Creeds and dogmas cannot, or do not, utterly negative it. This appeal it is which awakens the spiritual consciousness of the children. It is not a plea these parents make for one group of dogmas as against another, but for intellectual integrity in treating any or all of them; and emphasis on the fundamental appeal of Jesus to a way of life.

S. B. M.

"IS SCIENCE A BLIND ALLEY?" is the title of an article in February *Harpers* by James Thurslow Adams, author of *The Founding of New England*, winner of the Pulitzer Prize as the best book of its year on the history of the United States. Science, he writes in effect, has become a new religion; that is, as science is translated to and by the man in the street. Mr. Adams raises the question whether such a religion can satisfy mankind.

He points out that different periods in history have had different intellectual "climates," and that the whole mentality of each period is dependent upon the particular "climate" then prevailing. Unless we understand this whole "intellectual climate" of a period we cannot understand its beliefs or its writings. He designates the present as, for want of a better name, the scientific. Present-day thinking "almost involuntarily rejects any general ideas or principles which cannot be 'verified' by harmonizing them with a succession of facts tested by instruments." It is the mechanico-materialistic interpretation of the universe held by scientists fifty years ago which has now filtered down to the public and became fixed in its mind.

The average man has no more use for Ritchie, White-

head, or Poincaré than he would have for the "Daytonians." To such there is no use in saying that the interpretation of fifty years ago is belated and abandoned. With free recognition of the achievements of science and its indispensableness for the life of the world today he asks, "But does science give us any satisfactory explanation of the universe?" To this question, he answers that it does not, and justifies his answer by quotations from the scientists mentioned above. The average man will not listen to this sort of thing even from leading scientists. He takes as a dogma the science of thirty years ago, and makes a religion out of it.

But this "science" leaves no room for and offers no satisfaction for those deep-lying instincts, longings, hopes, and values of life which group themselves as religion. "It can offer us not a single word of explanation or illumination as to the nature of the universe or ourselves. Its 'causes' are mere antecedents." Any explanation of the universe which teaches man that there can be no answer to his deepest questionings, that all his spiritual and moral values can be resolved into nothing, that he himself has no personality, etc., cannot always satisfy him. Happily, "far out on the frontier of knowledge are scientists who themselves glimpse something different." Maybe they will be the ones to open the door to a new philosophy of life and the world. Mr. Adams is not sure that the Daytonians will not be more ready to enter than these belated dogmatists of the already antiquated science of fifty years ago. Man's "instincts" are stronger than his reason, and man is more than his mind.

S. B. M.

THIS world with its activities is rapidly ceasing to be "natural" and fast becoming "supernatural." While its impressiveness is sometimes obscured by the commonness of wonderful happenings, so that we are "sensation-satiated," on the other hand the sense increases that the older views of the natural order are inadequate to include and give rationale

to the ever-emerging new facts and forces. This feeling must have been shared by every one in some degree, so that even those who claim ability to give natural explanations of everything are prospecting on the future and expect to find the ways and means later.

This feeling is accompanied in many minds by the deepening conviction of the rational need of some Agency, personal or impersonal, immanent in all the universe, yet transcendent—transcendent in its very immanence.

Or, if one will, our concept and its content of the “natural” is not only changing, but is being enriched so profoundly that the older content of the concept “natural” is utterly submerged and is now more nearly synonymous with the older “supernatural.” How much more can be conceived as “the Supernatural” than what is today contained in, is the content of “the Natural,” might be very difficult to imagine or define. Many science theories have attributed to “Nature” all the potentialities and activities which the theologian has predicated of God—save perhaps personality. The distinction is fast being effaced. The “new Natural” is itself supernatural. Only the terms which once designated the concepts are left, and left empty.

Why, if we believe in a living, active, redemptive God—why keep up the fiction of a natural and a supernatural? Why not see that the terms are simply relative and not absolute; that from one point of view all is natural, while from another all is supernatural, for thus God may be recognized through all and in all? Is not he the ultimate reality in all, the “source and ground, the cause” of all that is?

The real problem, at least the significant one, is the problem of the personal or the impersonal. Is the ultimate ground and source of all (“natural” or “supernatural”), is that personal or impersonal? Is there purpose, will, moral rationality, or simply chance and a scheme of necessity—the effect of chance? Take “the impersonal” in the universe and name

it "nature," and "the personal" in nature and in man may well be thought of as supernatural; for man, the world-person, can use, so far master and direct "the impersonal." After all what we need to be assured of is a super-human, Friend as well as Lord of the Human.

S. B. M.

RELIGION, in the generic sense, is not a static or absolute somewhat. It is a becoming, a dynamic—the active Spirit within, initiating moral and spiritual life in man, awakening the individual being of a kindred nature and inviting responses of fellowship. *It is a divine-human energy, constantly creative* in the soul of man. The form which the religion response takes in life is determined almost wholly by the vision of God which comes to the soul and the evaluation also of man when religion is integral.

These visions, or ideas of God and man which come to the soul, widely vary; no two are exactly alike in two individuals or in the same individual any two hours. The essential in any real, vital religion is variety, freedom, capacity to comprehend and relate all the varying functionings and moods of life to the animating Spirit. That's why we have so many forms of religion experience; religion is a life. It is vital, creative, organizing a body to fit the moral and social as well as the individual changing needs and aspirations.

Thus it is that all the while *we are creating new religions*, inclusive of objective cults or systems. Individual experience, personal insights, social experience, group concepts, all become factors in our visioning of man and God and so in fashioning our religion. And since these factors are ever varying, so our vision, and so our creative souls bring into being new religions. Jesus did so in view of the Jewish religion. Paul did so with the religion of Jesus. Augustine replaced Paul, and Luther reversed the movement and went back to Paul. Every deep awakening and movement of the human spirit has changed or lightened the vision of God and man and been accompanied

by the creation of a new religion. For every new vision of God means or carries with it a new appreciation of the worth in man; and reciprocally every new vision of man's dignity and worth opens the soul's eyes for a clearer vision of God. Religion is a divine-human energy, creative, and is initially the act of God in the soul of man.

And we are in this kind of a creative activity of God in the soul of man at this hour. This is no mere simple reformation either of doctrine or practise. We are factors in and witnesses of the creation of a new religion.

This may appear as an irreverent thing to many who have thought of "Christianity as the final religion"; meaning by "Christianity" their own creation and doctrinal structure of the materials of the life of Jesus. They do not see that no two of the New Testament writers have the same religion; that the Fathers created a new religion for the old name; and that no two centuries, no two decades of the centuries since have had the same religion. Every generation sees Christianity created anew. Continuity may be recognized, but not sameness. Progress, true religion's distinctive mark, were not possible otherwise. To go back to an older religion would be an irreligion, the denial of religion, a superstition.

And this movement, this creative functioning is not primarily, or only, ours. It is the urge, the dynamic urge of the Spirit which initiates all religion, and we are but cooperators with the Will of the universe. Or if we resist it, in whatever pious way, we are in exactly the place, the mind, and the spirit of those to whom Stephen said: "Stiff-necked, uncircumcised in heart and ear, you are always resisting the holy Spirit. As with your fathers, so with you" (*Moffat's Translation*).

S. B. M.

AN article that might bear the title, "The Myths of Science," by Professor Paul Laubenstein, of Union Theological Seminary, in the February, 1928, *Atlantic*, arrests attention

and should have response. It calls attention to the tendency to extend the authority of certain exact sciences to any series of phenomena and their interpretation which call themselves scientific.

It is unfortunate that it must be left to the theological professor to call attention to this tendency; especially in view of the fact that for those who yield to this tendency the theologian is assumed to be prejudiced, and without authority. The facts maintained, however, will be recognized and have, indeed, been criticized by the more erudite and liberal scientists; but they are still assumed as valid principles.

Doctor Laubenstein writes, "There are areas in which certain scientific methods, perfected after many years of experimentation, have proven themselves to be especially successful." It is therefore assumed that all science participates in this general adequacy, "and its authority 'spills over' from one field into another, irrespective of differences in the material dealt with, and of the types of technique required in different cases."

Certain false assumptions, gratuitously made, underlie what may be called the new dogmatism of science as when, for instance, we hear much of the "certitudes of science." The impression becomes general that science is infallible, and here we have "a new variety of myth taking form under our very eyes." Science takes for granted, and we acquiesce, the privilege of making mistakes without discredit to its authority, and that such mistakes are made is clearly evident; but similar mistakes in religion seem to warrant opprobrious terms and its utter discredit.

Or again, we have the unwarranted assumption that scientific methods and categories are interchangeable. Success in dealing with the forces of external Nature leads to the notion that the same methods are equally good in the realm of human experience. But the methods of dealing with matter, when applied to life, yield only measurable physicochemical results. So the application of these methods to life and to mind bring

result in vast diversity of opinion between animist, introspectionist, vitalist, Freudian, behaviorist, and Gestalist.

A third gratuitous assumption is that science (here meaning psychology) is perfectly capable of rendering a true and exhaustive account of human experience. "A psychology of religion, so long as it uses methods borrowed from the physical sciences, can hope to deal only partially with life in its religious aspects."

Another such assumption is to be found in the fact that the specialist in any particular science is *ipso facto* also well qualified to speak with equal authority on religion or philosophy. But we have learned to distinguish between the scientist talking as a scientist and the scientist talking as philosopher or religionist.

There is a science slogan "Let facts speak for themselves!" Would that they could; but the writer insists that facts in reality are mute. It is our tongues which give them utterance; we make them vocal, and it is we who speak. The scientist deceives himself often with his own subjectivity and gives us but his personal reflections of Nature.

More serious, in some respects, is the idea that science methods and categories are the only valid and legitimate way, both for the discovery of truth and for its description and explanation. "Not only has the modern scientific complex led us to demand proof as a condition of the acceptance of any Reality, but it has deluded us into believing that the only proof worthy of the name, adequate and true, is proof set up in scientific formulæ. The interpretative humanities on the other hand, and especially religion, must often utter their voices, if they would be articulate at all, in a medium not always adapted to that which they would express—namely, in language. Hence the use of simile, metaphor, analogy, symbol, allegory, statements and terms often vague and indistinct, meet for aspects of experience for which articulateness and exact presentation are indifferent matters."

Perhaps the most vulnerable of these criticisms of Doctor Laubenstein will be his affirmation that the "uniformity of natural processes" is a postulate unproved because, strictly speaking, there are no absolutely identical repetitions. "Even the scientist's most useful conceptions, like atom, energy, gravitation, are hypothetical and acceptable only as they serve to systematize thought and permit deductions verifiable in experience."

The author feels that one who trusts the validity of scientific findings is in no position to reproach the mystical philosopher with the accusation that he has made Nature over in his own image. "It is only upon the assumption, in faith, by the scientist that there is a rational basis in Nature which will validate his own rational methods and categories, that he can hope to arrive at anything more than a mere projection of his own rationality upon Nature."

Can the hope be entertained that these hypotheses will be recognized as hypotheses and not used as if they had the authority of demonstrations? An hypothesis, as such, is an absolutely necessary form of the search for truth, but cannot, in reason and logic, then be used as a certified dogma, so long as "*search for truth*" has reality of meaning. Such a use of an hypothesis is simply an acquiescence in the practise of begging the question.

S. B. M.

WHAT bearing has science upon the beliefs of religion? Natural scientists are inclined to the position that the forces of the universe, as discovered, can be explained in terms of general mechanical laws. They have no need for the "God" hypothesis in their laboratory. Most psychologists are bent upon reducing the inner controls of personality to mechanistic principles of explanation. Even mysticism has been interpreted by them without the need of the theistic premise. Modern science has undoubtedly been moving toward a philosophy of mechanism to explain man, his environment, and their inter-relation.

Religion, on the other hand, has depended upon a foundation of personalism. This apparent conflict between religion and science was the theme to engage the attention of the Religious Education Association at its recent convention in Philadelphia.

How may men educate for religion in an age of science? Two factors stood out strikingly at this conference: One, the wide diversity of educational leadership that constitutes the Association; the other, the variety of view-points recognized in the proceedings. Happily, the fellowship includes more than those leaders who have come to be designated technically as "religious educationalists." Theologians, biologists, college presidents, Biblicists, astronomers, psychologists, and ministers are counted in the company. Catholic, Jewish, Unitarian, and Evangelical representatives are joined in the enterprise. The burden of these men is to work out more desired methods of religious activity to serve the cultural needs of our generation. A fine spirit of tolerance and good-will prevails in the organization.

Men were not expected to agree in their thinking at the Philadelphia conference. They were asked to "face the facts" as the theme of the convention was defined. No resolutions were drafted to suggest the findings of the meeting. A plurality of judgments was expressed. Some leaders insisted that the postulates of the natural sciences should be the major principles controlling the religious educator. What men needed was "truth." Others felt that theology and church history suggested premises of primary importance for the religious educator. They maintained that people live by loyalties, sentiments, and mores in religious circles. Historic symbolism therefore retained much value in the church. Some felt that the experience of God was an initial one in religion, others that it was a goal of religious quest which might or might not be achieved in a person's experience. It was stressed repeatedly that no religion could be expected to win the moral support of educated men which tried to disapprove of the work of modern

science, or that tried to compromise on matters of adjustment in order to keep the peace. Religion must learn to face all the facts from whatever source, and honestly to make its program such that it does not run counter to the well-established position of science. At the same time, it was recognized that religion has a distinctive work to do which can never be taken over by science.

S. G. C.

WHAT'S WHAT IN THE MAGAZINES

CORRECTION

Couchoud, *Was the Gospel of Mark Written in Latin?*
(Jan., 1928), CROZER QUARTERLY:

Errata:

Page 76, line 9, read *Italia* for *Halia*.

line 24, read "is not a mere pleonasm" for
"is a mere pleonasm."

Page 77, line 3, read *exsecratio* for *executio*.

APPROACHES TO REALITY

A NEW approach is made to the old debate of materialism and idealism by Dr. A. S. Tuttle in *The Canadian Journal of Religious Thought* for December, 1927. The fact of Reality as "an ultimate world over against the proximate" is accepted "for sake of argument." Though we might perhaps suggest that, granted this fact, the argument is at an end.

The first avenue of approach is that of science. Science necessarily tends to mechanize. It deals with things as though they were static. But these things are but points in the flowing stream we know as the universe. Science can catch the points but never the flux itself. That is, the universe is a unit—these observable things reach down into the real and give it mechanical form. "The Real Other wears the garments of actuality and may be known in these, its incarnations."

Though science cannot then reach Reality it gives a "ground plan" of it. Taking over this plan or "diagram," philosophy by relating it to the Whole provides another way of approach. By relating all facts which science presents we are inevitably led to a unity, and those facts can only so be intelligently understood.

But another avenue opens up—"the pathway of intuitions." Truth is often flashed into the mind by "intuitional insight." Great discoveries of science have been foreshadowed by philosophers. So the soul at times plumbs the infinite depths of Reality. Through Art, Religion, Ethics the doorway of intuition leads to the heights of Truth. That which makes the artist is the ability to see beyond the "appearance" into the "real" that lies at the heart.

Following Kant, "the moral law within me" declares as true a law within the universe itself. Religion, by its expression of human search for satisfaction indicates also that response of the universe that can give peace. There is a Something greater than ourselves which personality demands. Finally, that Something is revealed fully in Jesus Christ.

R. E. E. H.

"THE NEW SCIENCE OF MISSIONS" has discovered its business, according to Professor Archibald G. Baker, in an article, "The Response of Christian Missions to a Changing World," in the *International Journal of Religious Education*, February, 1928. During the political ascendancy of the Occident, Christians assumed an attitude of benevolence in their missionary spirit and ministrations to Oriental peoples. Eastern nations have become self-assertive in recent years and are now challenging the imperialism of Western Christianity. If Americans are to continue their missionary propaganda in the East they must change the whole manner of their approach to these peoples. A spirit of cooperation, fraternalism, and reciprocity must be substituted for the historic attitude of paternalism and superiority. "It is easier to give the 'heathen' the gospel than to give them justice or respect."

This reciprocal interplay of religious attitudes between the Christian and non-Christian introduces problems in missionary propaganda that have far-reaching inferences. The question of doctrine is a case in point. Have Christians a

monopoly of divine truth? Will Christian belief undergo change as a result of contact with other religious view-points? The enterprise becomes a very complex one. The "scientist" must survey the whole situation, observe the forces at work, recognize their relative value, and introduce a policy that will conserve the good from the past while at the same time judiciously creating the better of the future. S. G. C.

A good bibliography of current religious books is always a welcome instrument. Two lists have been published recently: "A Selected Bibliography in Religious Education," by the Editor, *Religious Education*, December, 1927, pp. 1045-1064, and "A Book a Month for 1928," by the Board of Editors, *International Journal of Religious Education*, January, 1928, pp. 19-23. The former set is quite comprehensive in scope, including such themes as psychology, home life, learning and teaching processes, administration of religious education, church functions, character tests, and so forth. The latter list is organized according to pastoral, teaching, parent, superintendent, work with age groups, et cetera, classifications. In either case, many of the most reliable texts in religion, from the point of view of parish work, are included in these pages. The first mentioned list includes seventy-five marked copies which should be included in any church school library.

S. G. C.

WHAT are our generation of students thinking about religion? Are our higher institutions of learning making it easier or more difficult for youth to be religious? There is much speculation on these subjects in ministerial circles. There is little reliable evidence to decide the matter. A cross-section of student attitudes toward religion in Brown University is provided in an article by Professor Miller Burrows, in the *Journal of Religion*, January, 1928, pp. 63-82. The writer has enunciated the method that a "professor of religion" employs

in the classroom and the type of voluntary responses that his fellow students register.

One fact stands out strikingly. That is, that thinking youth have repudiated authoritative religion and have determined to "have their own minds" in matters religious. This reaction from the overhead control of traditionalism has led many to resort to extreme views, without empirical grounds to support their position. At the same time, it has provided students with freedom to work out their own salvation according to honest and industrious self-inquiry. Not a few are taking this advantage and are discovering that religion is as normal a function of the individual as patriotism or courtship. Religion, from this point of view, is not confined to creed or ecclesiasticism. These are types of manifestations, and may take many forms according to the wishes of social groups. Religion is primarily a way of life that enriches personality and deepens faith in the redemptive potentialities of the human family. Professor Burrows cites many statements of students that bear out this adventurous spirit of modern religion. He also gives evidence to show that it must be in harmony with the facts of life in order to abide. Collegiate experience, instead of crushing religion, may provide youth with the opportunity to rediscover it in a new light and with fresh vigor.

S. G. C.

"*ADOLESCENCE*" is the key article in the February number of *Children*. Dr. Jessie Taft, Director, Child Study Department, Children's Aid Society of Pennsylvania, has presented, in popular though reliable form, some points for adults to remember during the critical period in every child's development. Not all parents learn to respect the personality of the growing child in order to make his maturing process as normal as possible. Blessed is the adult who can get the social viewpoint of the teen-age child. This position is imperative if one is to respect his problems and weigh his resources to meet them.

The immature member of society will welcome help from the more mature member if it is introduced in a friendly and understanding spirit. Overcoddling of their children by adults leads to emotional dependence and social incompetency in later complex life-situations. The adolescent demands opportunity for self-expression and has a right to have a degree of independence commensurate with his ability to meet the demands of his day. Emotional maturity is a more difficult and as necessary achievement as physical or intellectual maturity.

A "program for group discussion" in mother's meetings, church clubs, or parent-teacher associations accompanies this article (page 62), and would make a profitable study for any group interested in a more adequate understanding of the adolescent age.

S. G. C.

"THE Significance for Religious Education of Trends in the Psychology of Religion" in the January number of *Religious Education*, pp. 7-19, is a timely theme. The article is written by Prof. William C. Bower of the University of Chicago. After surveying the field of psychology of religion from its genesis in the work of Starbuck and Coe (1899-1900), through the efforts of such representatives as James, Höffding, Ames, King, Durkheim, and Martin, the writer ventures to gather up some of the most important contributions that psychology of religion can make to religious education. It is the business of the psychology of religion to differentiate religious experience from other kinds of experience. It becomes the task of religious education to help the individual control such religious experience for the ends of enriched human living. Both sciences are converging more and more upon human personality and the attitudes-values that it can possess. A Supreme Person, the Creator of Values, who is a fundamental part of cosmic reality, is implied as a "logical outcome" of this position.

If intellectual, economic, social, ethical, et cetera, types of

personal experience are represented by overlapping ellipses, then the common area where these meet represents the locus of religious experience. The latter arises "where all particular values whatsoever are integrated into a total meaning and worth of life." From this point of view, Professor Bower illustrates how the content and pattern of the conception of God evolved through the pastoral, conquest, nation-building, international adjustment, and nationally disintegrating periods, in Hebrew culture of Bible times. The writer witnesses in this racial experiment not only a functional value of the theistic idea but also "a heightened sense of the self-disclosure of God." It follows that:

Religious ideas and attitudes must root themselves deeply in the rich and fertile soil of the experience of growing persons where life is being lived, where ends that are judged in the light of their relation to God are being achieved.

S. G. C.

It has generally been supposed that the question of the historicity of Jesus has long been settled. The daring doubts of the critics of a half-century gone had been met and answered in favor of the Christian records and faith. But once more the problem has been raised, this time not by the traditional German but by French scholars,¹ with all the power and brilliancy of that vivid, picturesque style for which they are so universally and justly noted.

The most conspicuous of these—P. L. Couchoud, in *Le Mystère de Jésus*—follows Renan and Loisy, but carries them, he claims, to their logical conclusions. The real Jesus is denied. But that does not overthrow Christianity or deny its truth. It is easier, however, to explain Christianity without Jesus than with him. One cannot explain the Man but one can explain the Ideal, which is born of that long age of Hebrew teaching and promise, faith and hope, denied and scorned by actual experiences of oppression and disaster. Then came the vision

¹ *French Modernism*, W. G. Jordan. *The Canadian Journal of Religious Thought*, December, 1927.

of the true God, the Suffering Servant, Yahweh humanized, striving, suffering with his children toward a new and nobler life. Paul caught the vision—perhaps from Peter—and carried the Ideal to the world. Once again the creator of Christianity is this Paul . . . “a terrible little man, a spirit of fire in the body of a dwarf, timid yet bold, feeble yet arrogant, a weakling who wielded divine power, an unwearied invalid, a beggar who conquered the world.” And the Gospel stories are written on the basis of his sermons.

Such is the view presented with force and beauty by the present-day French modernists. Perhaps we will say that they have created a problem no less disturbing than the original, but at least they are convinced that within Christianity moves a spiritual power which, being apprehended by men of old in the weary arena of life's conflict, saved them, and may redeem society today.

R. E. E. H.

THE Ancient Maya civilization is slowly but surely being reconstructed by the patient work of the explorer and archaeologist. Some of the laurels of the descendants of the Mayflower have gone to crown other heads. If antiquity is the badge of honor, then on this continent the Mayas seem to have the first place. *Science* for November, 1927, *The Scientific Monthly*, November, 1927, the *Museum Journal*, and others give us a peep into the work done in Yucatan, Guatemala, Nicaragua, and other states, and some of the results to date. They carry us back through the centuries preceding the discovery of America by Columbus and introduce us to thronged cities with fine culture and stable government, back through millennia of national history, back to the period when Greece led the “Old World” in mathematics and philosophy, and introduce us to the achievements of Maya astronomers and mathematicians who six centuries before Christ had worked out a fairly reliable calendar. How much older their civilization was no one would venture to say, but that man was on this

continent millennia earlier, struggling for self-expression and for satisfactions, is a certainty.

I. G. M.

THE Origin of the Alphabet has during the last decade been the center of a lively interest. Thirty years ago it was confidently attributed to the Phœnicians. Certain traditions looked that way. A thousand years before the Christian era, or thereabouts, was the earliest date to which there could be ascribed any inscription in the "Phœnician" alphabet. The Moabite stone, the Siloam inscription, and the ostraka of Samaria, all around 900 B. C., were the chief remains of early date. No distinctly Phœnician inscription antedated these.

But when a few years ago, a great mortuary chamber with an inscribed sarcophagus was laid bare in Byblos, by the erosion of the hillside, a new chapter in the story of the alphabet was opened. The age of the inscription was perhaps its most important feature. As the alphabetic signs differed but little from those already known there was no difficulty in decipherment. But the evidence seems to show that the sarcophagus belongs to the middle of the thirteenth century and hence the alphabet was pushed back some three or four centuries earlier than previously.

But this conclusion had barely been assimilated when the world was startled by the announcement of Grimme's decipherment of the Sinaitic graffiti. These had been known for decades, but little had been achieved towards their interpretation. Grimme did valuable service and set the philologists all agog with his findings. Amongst other interesting things he discovered Moses and Hatshepsut the daughter of Thutmose I of Egypt and almost duplicated parts of the Old Testament story. This aroused interest, and many minds went to work. The most recent and most thorough contribution is in the recent *Harvard Theological Review* from the pen of Père Butin, of the Catholic National University in Washington. Professor Butin made a careful examination of the originals,

which, thanks to the work of the Harvard Expedition to Sinai in 1927-28, are now in the Egyptian Museum in Cairo. These seem, unquestionably, to be the earliest inscriptions yet found in which a Semitic alphabet is used. The signs are primitive and more closely approximate the forms of the objects from which they take their names than those found anywhere else. That is, the *aleph* (ox-head) is an ox's head, the *yadh* (hand) is a hand, etc. Later these signs became conventionalized and often lost all resemblance to the original. But here we have many of them in good picture form. This fact, together with others of like value, points to a very early date, perhaps as early as the end of the nineteenth century as the most appropriate date for these inscriptions. While careful scrutiny of the originals failed to disclose Pharaoh's daughter or add corroboration to the Old Testament story, it certainly gives us new light on the writing of the early Semites. I. G. M.

"THE faith of the fathers" or "the religion of the children"—such seems to be the problem of both church and university. Certainly this is the situation for multitudes of youth in their relation to church and school.

The "faith of the fathers" is a favorite, sometimes pious, phrase with some who shrink from adjusting themselves to the changes involved in educational and religious dogmatic and technique. Ostensibly concerned with conserving an essential religious value, many are, in truth, simply disturbed over the necessity of thinking their way into new forms of belief, or of making ventures in the religion realm where experience might furnish vital factors for a truly dynamic spiritual life. Often conservatism is simply sheer spiritual inertia, justified by professed concern for a sacrosanct faith.

Which is the more important—"to be true till death to the faith of the fathers" or to conserve the religion of the children? is a question which is getting itself asked. Shall we treasure the faith of the revered but dead saints and lose the

religion and spiritual life of those now living? This insistent pair of alternatives will not resolve itself and must be solved by teachers and preachers—the faith of the fathers or the religion of the children? In his new volume *Current Christian Thinking* (see Book Reviews) Dr. G. B. Smith urges that “the religion of the children” should be the fateful concern.

Educationally the same problem, and in effect the same conclusion, is presented by President E. M. Hopkins of Dartmouth College. He holds that the function of education is “*to seek truth rather than to conserve faith.*” In an article in *Scribners* for February, 1928, he raises the question,

Will not the interest of youth itself . . . be best served by insistence on the part of the college that there are boundaries beyond which the search for knowledge must not go?

He does not believe so; and insists that the students would then be in the same dilemma as was the maiden whose mother consented she should go in to swim but forbade her to go near the water. The difficulty of the educator is that of disassociation of the minds of the students from acceptance, *without examination*, of the thinking of generations which have preceded their own, and to recognize the limitations of the faith of the fathers to be serviceable to their sons. The “truth” of one generation may become superstition in the next.

President Hopkins holds that “the responsibility of the college is not to the fathers but to the sons,” and the college “can not for a moment place any interest above the advantage of the undergraduates committed to its care.”

Any other attitude would involve an inhibition of that most definitely divineline power of man—to think. The mere assertion of a dogma, in science, art, or religion, that it is true does not give it immunity from doubt. If a man is not free to question all forms of teaching he is not free rationally to affirm it; and, if he does not “understand” it he is not capable with reason to deny it.

There is no more sure way to commit the race to the con-

stant repetition or even perpetuation of error than to give to any group or generation authority to define truth with finality. Thus freedom to teach, implying freedom to think and freedom of speech are the *sine qua non* of real attainment of truth.

The great obligation of the college is to inspire men to think, rather to tell them what to think. The worth-while student's mind is a workshop, not a storehouse.

S. B. M.

AGAIN the question of the finality of Christianity as the world's religion has been raised and answered with satisfaction to all who are certain that this religion is the divinely revealed one. Such is the feeling one has in reading "Religions and Religion" by Nathaniel Micklem in *The Canadian Journal of Religious Thought* (January-February, 1928) in which the author gives evidence of the usual lack of knowledge, on the part of such writers, either of the history of religions or of the philosophy of religion.

One cannot agree with his first premise—so generally stated—that "all over the world and in every period to which we have access we find the belief in gods and goddesses or spiritual beings animating or controlling the phenomena of nature." There are religions, we believe it possible to demonstrate, that have no gods. Nor can the following statement be accepted at face value, "The third well-nigh universal element in religion is a belief, often vague and perhaps rarely effective, in a Great Spirit or Father-God." And surely a student of religions and the social sciences would find himself in disagreement with its corollary, "The scientific study of religion shows that man is intuitively, if dimly, aware of the world as a moral order, and of a God as the author and ground of this order."

The author's thesis is that a religion claiming universality and finality must satisfy man's desires and hopes not only in respect to these two questions of nature and morals but also of death that is inevitable. That satisfaction is found, not in

Christianity, but in "Christianity as the religion of Christ." Historic Christianity may not be true to "the religious experience of Jesus Christ." But in him we find a faith in the "Fatherhood of God" which reveals the Way of life. Jesus also had a faith in Him that enabled him to triumph over the "terrible side of nature." True in Jesus there is to be found a "freshness and naïveté . . . an antinomy or paradox, not to be logically solved," yet nevertheless there was a trust in the omnipotent and good God that enabled him to endure the evils of this world. And, lastly, he had such faith in the goodness of God that immortality was an absolute certainty to him.

Thus the three great problems of man—the evils of physical nature, the right way of living socially, the unknown hereafter—find their solutions in the religion of Jesus, says Doctor Micklem. But are we sure of that religion? Did the writers of the Gospel stories tell all of Jesus' doubts and questions? How much of the writers' own difficulties are reflected in these stories? It is freely confessed that this "religion of the Christ" has not yet come down to us. Can we ever hope therefore to recapture it and make it vital in human affairs? Would that religion of a pre-scientific age meet the questions of the troubled mind today?

But is there not a hope that with the passing of the years, the drawing together of the world of men, our understanding of religion's search and our knowledge of the constructive forces of life, we may be able to develop a religion that shall satisfy all these desires of men? Whether we are aware of it or not it may be said that we are now within that process.

R. E. E. H.

BOOK REVIEWS

A Pilgrimage to Palestine. HARRY EMERSON FOSDICK. New York: The Macmillan Company. 1927.

THIS volume, a series of essays, from the facile pen of the well-known, gifted New York pastor, is the result of personal experience in and around Jerusalem during the winter of 1926-27. It shows a degree of very careful work. Encyclopædias were never far away and an open Bible must ever have been close to the author's elbow. Geography, history, custom ancient and modern, and Bible story ever adorn the pathway of the pilgrim. A wealth of information has thus been presented in a most readable volume.

Ofttimes the author is critical, which is another way of saying, intelligent. He has little patience with that sort of credulous ignorance which is the chief religious gift of some American tourists. He looks rather askance at the ordinary tourist party that "does the Holy Land" under the direction of the great commercial agencies. He is none too severe when he concludes that "nothing in Palestine under a roof is much worth seeing," or when he laments the sectarian bitterness, the riot, and the mummery that is found staged by official Christianity around the so-called sacred sites. His criticism of Zionism and his conclusion that "if it would be successful it must be unselfish" are well-weighed words of wisdom.

But when Doctor Fosdick gets us out in the open he is at his best—and his worst. At his best, in his colorful descriptions, and the accuracy of the portrayal of what he has seen. At his worst, when he permits his emotions to control his historical sense and thus a possibility becomes a certainty. Fosdick's description of Sinai is overwhelming, but we are sure his eye could find equally cogent agreement with the Old Testament story among the mountains of Midian or in those lying between Kadesh-Barnea and Petra. *Verisimilitude* is not very *convincing*. Indeed, often when the author has us out in the open spaces we have the uncanny sense that an official guide, with a very limited knowledge of the Bible but with a great desire to please the pious, is pouring his well-learned story into our ears. With a thorough knowledge, we take it, of the history of the documents of the Old Testament, the writer has had a peculiar disregard for their respective historical values. The story that comes from four or six centuries later than the experience is treated in the same way as that which lies close to the event. The illustration used to emphasize a late theological theory is used indiscriminately with the best historical sources.

In fact, not a few pages of this delightful volume would easily classify the Professor of Homiletics in Union Theological Seminary as a traditionalist.

The reviewer heartily agrees with the author when he says,

One feels afresh how far from the real issue our Western literalism is, when it takes from an ancient Semitic literature wonder-tales about the sun and moon standing still, or creation stories about the making of the world in six days, or narratives of marvel or magic of any kind, and tries to pound and press them into scientific fact (p. 137).

But we feel that if Doctor Fosdick has freed himself from the cramping bonds of Western literalism in the field of scientific fact, he has still some distance to go in the discrimination of the documents of the different ages if he is to be free from Western literalism and be an adequate interpreter of the moral and spiritual values of the Old Testament literature and of the Hebrew people.

I. G. M.

Christianity and Judaism Compare Notes. H. F. RALL and S. S. COHEN. New York: The Macmillan Company.

THIS volume is the result of an effort on the part of certain Jewish and Christian leaders to have the faith and purpose of each presented intelligently to the other. The first part is a series of lectures that Professor Rall delivered to the students of Hebrew Union College in Cincinnati. The theme "The Meaning of Christianity" is presented in four chapters, under the titles The Christian Fellowship, The Christian Conviction, The Christian Way, and the Christian Hope. The topics are self-revealing. The attitude is adequately expressed in the statement that the conviction, so far as Jesus is concerned, is the belief

that in a unique sense this self-revealing and redeeming God was present, in His truth and in His love, in Jesus of Nazareth, that there we have the very life of God incarnate in man, the word of God to which we hearken, the message of God in which we trust (p. 35).

Professor S. S. Cohen is Professor of Jewish Theology in Hebrew Union Theological Seminary. His lectures on "What Is Judaism" are also presented in four chapters, The Nature of Judaism, Faith and Reason in Judaism, Principles of Judaism and Reformed Judaism—in about one hundred pages. Doctor Cohen's work has been done very skilfully. He has presented Judaism at its best. This is as it should be. Professor Rall did the same thing. The narrow and the intolerant in any religion, valuable as it may be, is never the true representative. Only that which is vital, is progressive, is adaptable, and hence is able to perpetuate itself through the ages, can be truly characteristic.

Hence Professor Cohen presents the outstanding movements of Judaism as found in the great crises. Thus we have the moral, social, and universal element in the Bible emphasized as the starting-point. This is followed by the philosophic activity and the conclusion that "reason is the bond of union between man and God" (p. 35). Following this is reason's work on faith as expressed in the creed of Maimonides, then naturally follows the story of the history and principles of Reformed Judaism. In brief space the author presents to the Gentile reader an illuminating picture of the soul of Judaism.

The volume is a wholesome sign of the times. Many are now willing at least to listen to a fair presentation of the views of those who differ from them. Christianity has surely much to learn from Judaism. In part, at least, we use the same Book. We must use the same methods of interpretation, and so far as the Hebrew Scriptures are concerned they must have exactly the same interpretation for all who read them carefully. The two millennia of history of Judaism are most illuminating. In some important ways they parallel that of Christianity. There was a similar struggle, similar intellectual processes, and then similar orientation in a modern scientific age. The book ought to be helpful to those of both religions who are interested in historical movements and problems of adjustment.

I. G. M.

The Story of the Commandments: A Study of the Hebrew Decalogue in Its Ancient and Modern Application. CONRAD HENRY MOEHLMAN. Rochester Theological Seminary. New York: Harcourt, Brace and Company.

"As interesting as a novel," so said a friend about it, and there is no doubt of it. It opens with the story of a young Jew preparing for confirmation while his Catholic and Presbyterian schoolmates, respectively, study their catechisms. A Lutheran, who had been with them in all their sports, was the fourth member of the quartet. Together they attended the movie "The Ten Commandments." This is the beginning of a very readable discussion of the varying interpretations of the Ten Commandments. The last chapter is the Ten Commandments up to date. All the way between is a pilgrimage along the highways of human struggle under the guidance of a competent scholar.

Here you have a Calvinist who has loudly proclaimed his belief in the inerrancy of Scripture, going to the Book to assure himself of the truth of his theories. Calvin McPherson thus stumbles on some facts. There are remarkable differences between the two recensions of the Decalogue. Why these differences? With different reasons for the observance of these commandments, what reason is valid for him? Then he finds in

Exodus xxxiv another Decalogue, quite different in content, but called a Decalogue, and just as much one as either of the other two. Again in Exodus xxii he finds a duplicate of this Decalogue but with considerable variation. Calvin McPherson started out with one Decalogue; now that he has four, he is in a real perplexity. His cherished theories of inspiration fail to meet the new facts.

Thus the author opens up to the reader many of the unsuspected treasures of the Scriptures, giving throughout adequate interpretation. But he does not stop short with the cogent Biblical facts. Varying interpretations throughout the centuries of Christian history are presented in most arresting fashion. The story of the Sabbath, for instance, moves quickly from the early joyous festivities down through succeeding changes till we come to the "Christian Sabbath." Indeed it is a romance. So is it chapter after chapter. It is a piece of fine work, with a wealth of information in every chapter, and yet so readable that it ought to be a delight to the layman. We hope it may become one of the "best sellers."

I. G. M.

Lectures on the Religion of the Semites, the Fundamental Institutions. The late WILLIAM ROBERTSON SMITH. Third edition, with an introduction and additional notes by STANLEY A. COOK. New York: The Macmillan Company.

W. ROBERTSON SMITH was one of the pioneers in the field of comparative religion. Not only did he see more clearly than most of his contemporaries that a comparative study of religion was essential to a true evaluation of any religion, but he also recognized that the study of primitive religions would throw much light on the transient and the permanent elements in religion.

In 1894 he issued the first edition of *The Religion of the Semites*. For a multitude of students it has been a mine of information. Because of its clarity and its sanity it has stimulated many in the field of wider research. Many authors—Legrange, Curtis, Barton, Jastrow, and others—have written on the same or closely related themes, but none has replaced this study. In the unusual keenness of perception and rare good judgment it has a quality and a value all its own.

It is thus a piece of good fortune that the third edition, revised and enlarged, has been issued. The body of the text varies but slightly from that of the first. The additions are found in the additional notes. These, covering some 200 pages, are very full and bring the volume up to date. The attitude of the author is admirably preserved, and with the additional notes it is today as valuable a piece of work as the original edition was for an earlier generation.

I. G. M.

Anthropos and Son of Man. A Study in the Religious Syncretism of the Hellenistic Orient. CARL H. KRAELING, Ph.D., Instructor at the Lutheran Theological Seminary at Philadelphia. New York: Columbia University Press. 1927. Pp. x, 191.

PERHAPS no more interesting, certainly no more baffling, problem exists for students of the New Testament than that centering in the enigmatic phrase *Son of Man*. Twenty years ago Schweitzer declared the problem had been solved. As is the case for most "solved" problems, the lack of solution of this particular one was evident almost before the ink of Schweitzer's very valuable contribution was dry. Ever and anon during the intervening years fresh attempts at solution have been offered and rejected. To solve the riddle, the passages in Daniel and Enoch, the words of Psalm 8:4, the *ben 'adam* of Ezekiel, and Isaiah 53 have been worked and reworked. It has been like attempting to solve a series of algebraic equations whose number unfortunately is less than the number of unknowns to be discovered. Recently Professor R. Reitzenstein, a scholar to whom all students of the New Testament are profoundly indebted, has attempted a different approach to the riddle. Is not the Jewish-Christian Son of Man but one manifestation of the ubiquitous Oriental figure known as "the Anthropos"?

In the present study Doctor Kraeling examines this brilliant suggestion. Although in the end he dissents from Professor Reitzenstein's conclusion, at least so far as direct indebtedness is concerned, he feels that the work done by the German scholar in emphasizing the importance of the rôle played by "lesser personages such as messengers, prophets, and fore-runners in Jewish religious expectation" may contribute to the eventual solution of the problem.

The chief value of this volume is the careful study and discussion of the different cycles of thought that have contributed to this "ubiquitous figure." Leading up to his chapter on *The Origin and Antiquity of the Anthropos*, he has surveyed the Manichean, the Hellenistic and Western Gnostic, and the Mandaean traditions, and has acquainted the reader—so far as a lay reader can be acquainted—with these complicated and fantastic speculations.

Doctor Kraeling has not been limited, as were his earlier predecessors, to the voluminous but hostile polemics of the Christian heresiologists, but has been able to make use of the three first-hand sources, the corpus of Coptic Gnostic works, the large body of Mandaean writings, and the mass of Turfan texts on Manicheism.

He finds three distinct stages in the developing Anthropos tradition.

(1) The earliest is that which views him as the primordial champion, a

mythical person without name who was believed to have been a part of the pre-existent spiritual creations of Ahuramazda and who later became identified with Marduk. The elements of this syncretism go back through Babylonia to Iran. (2) Later he becomes identified with the Soul, probably in Mesopotamia, where the Chaldean Tale is interpreted in the light of the Soul Drama. (3) Finally through bringing Anthropos and Soul together the idea arose that the Anthropos reappeared for the salvation of the soul as a divine savior. This finds its culmination in the theology of Manicheism. Here we find an echo of all the steps of the preceding development.

The Manichean Primal Man is defeated and victorious champion, the father-creator of man and the origin of an element of man's constitution, and one who is manifested in seven saviors from Adam to Mani.

Doctor Kraeling believes that it is impossible to explain the apocalyptic figure of the Son of Man in Jewish writings as a product of Hebrew thought. He quite concurs with the cautious judgment of Schürer that Iran may be seen as "an aid to the development of Jewish thought," although he would probably incline to omit Schürer's phrase "rather than a controlling factor," for the Anthropos speculation can be employed to furnish an eminently satisfactory explanation of the origin of the Jewish *Bar Nasha* (Son of Man.) In his capacity of victorious primordial champion and manlike deity he was received into Judaism in the second pre-Christian century and provided the inspiration for the nameless "manlike-one" of Daniel, as well as for the "messianic interpretation" which the figure gained in Enoch. For the figure in Daniel Marduk is the nearest approximation, and rightly, since the Babylonian cosmogony underlies the thought. Although this was not indigenous to Hebrew soil, its roots took hold, and during the two centuries that elapsed between Daniel-Enoch and IV Esra its origin had become so obscured that to the Jew the Son of Man appeared intrinsically Jewish.

But though the influence of the Anthropos is clear in Jewish thinking and became a part of its speculation, Doctor Kraeling finds himself unable to feel it solves the problem of the Christian use of the term Son of Man. The use of this phrase in the Fourth Gospel, in Paul, and in the Synoptic Gospels is examined, although perhaps not in as much detail as one might almost desire, and the conclusion reached that no definite evidence of acquaintance with the Anthropos speculation is to be detected. It had made its contribution earlier in the pre-Christian Judaism, and in that form was of course indirectly responsible for the Christian phrase, but its later developments are not to be seen in the Christian writings.

Doctor Kraeling has done a very valuable and careful piece of work.

The work of Reitzenstein and his *pedissequi* is unfortunately not available to those who know but one tongue. This volume will at least tend to show which way the wind is blowing. No one knows better than the author himself the difficulty of the subject and the tentative nature of many of his conclusions. These do not detract from the value of the book.

M. S. E.

The Story of Jesus as Told by His Four Friends, Matthew, Mark, Luke, and John. Compared and Combined Into One Narrative. HELEN BARRETT MONTGOMERY. Philadelphia: The Judson Press. 1927. Pp. x, 284. Price, \$1.25.

THIS is an attempt to blend the accounts of the Four Gospels into one connected narrative in order to provide a clear-cut impression of the course of events in the life of Jesus for the youth of today. How far it will succeed is problematical. We must assume that a chronological order has been followed, for the editor so affirms. It must be admitted the present reviewer found some difficulty detecting it.

The charm and spontaneity and individuality of the separate accounts, each with its own purpose and plan, give way to the purpose and plan of the compiler. Perhaps it may arouse the desire in the hearts of the youthful readers for whom it is intended to read for themselves the separate accounts. If so, the effort may be worth while.

M. S. E.

Divorce and the Roman Dogma of Nullity. R. H. CHARLES, D. D., D. Litt., LL. D., Archdeacon of Westminster, Fellow of the British Academy. Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark. [New York: Charles Scribner's Sons.] 1927. Pp. ix, 100. Price, \$0.60.

AGAIN Doctor Charles, the English scholar who has written much in the field of apocalyptic and eschatological literature, raises the question of divorce in the New Testament. As was true of his earlier study, *The Teaching of the New Testament on Divorce* (1921), this present volume is an embodiment of a series of sermons preached in Westminster Abbey. The present sermons were occasioned by the recent declaration of nullity in the case of certain marriages by the Roman Church.

The Roman Church teaches that divorce is impossible; Doctor Charles dissents. Accordingly he seeks to show that the New Testament upholds his view. His principal concern is with the difference between Matthew 19:3-9 and Mark 10:2-11. On every ground Mark is inferior. For example, the question in Mark 10:2, "Is it lawful for a man to put away his wife?" is impossible, since "no sane or self-respecting Pharisee could have put to our Lord a question so entirely at variance with the Mosaic law. . ." Rather it is a mutilation of a question preserved in Matthew

19:3, "Is it lawful for a man to put away his wife for any cause?" This was a burning question for Judaism. Jesus by his answer opposes laxity in divorce. Infidelity alone is ground for separation. In such a case separation is not only allowed but is compulsory. Such an act destroys the union of those who had become one flesh. The words "except for unchastity" (μὴ ἐπὶ πορνείᾳ) are a correct but unnecessary gloss here, whereas the similar words in Matthew 5:32 are illogical, since divorce cannot make a woman an adulteress if she is one already. In this latter passage the woman under discussion was not an adulteress, but was divorced on some wholly inadequate ground. Mark's account is essentially unhistorical, and is to be rejected by us as it was by Matthew. Rome accepts it, but so much the worse for Rome. Jesus in the Synoptic Gospels is concerned only with the problem of what Doctor Charles terms "lesser grounds." These Jesus refuses utterly to sanction.

In the passage which now stands in the Gospel of John 8:3-11 (and which Charles accepts without comment), while Jesus refuses to act as judge in the case, he does not say, "'Return to thy husband'; for in her case total divorce was inevitable, since she had done the one thing that could dissolve a union between husband and wife."

Having thus proved to his own satisfaction the two conclusions he had set out to prove: (1) That marriage is dissoluble when there is an absolute breach in its essential condition, unchastity; (2) that the guiltless has the right to contract a fresh marriage with the benediction of the Church—he devotes the concluding pages to an exposé of Rome's irrational and lawless teaching. Since Rome refuses to sanction divorce through her acceptance of Mark 10:2-12 (which clearly teaches that there is no ground for divorce, but which Charles has demonstrated to his own satisfaction is not true to the teaching of Jesus), she has been obliged to devise a series of artificial, fanciful, and often grotesque impediments to a valid marriage which will allow her to decide at her own convenience that no marriage has taken place. Several examples and illustrations of this corruption are appended.

Perhaps the most serious criticism that can be directed against this book—aside from its almost interminably repetitious style—is that it seeks to set the New Testament up again as the final authority. Doctor Charles may be right or he may be wrong as to which of the contradictory statements is to be attributed to Jesus, but he is certainly wrong if he thinks that this problem of marriage and divorce, which is to him quite obviously a burning problem, will be settled on the basis of exegesis of disputed texts or by the appeal to the authority of a name, however great be that name.

There may have been some reason for preaching this material as sermons to the folk who frequent Westminster Abbey. If so, it only goes to prove that it is usually unwise to publish sermons as books.

M. S. E.

Judaism and the Modern Mind. MAURICE H. FARBRIDGE. New York: The Macmillan Company. 1927. Pp. xi, 300. Price, \$2.25.

The great tragedy of Jewish life is the fact that there is everywhere a breaking away from the ancient Jewish landmarks, without anything being done to replace them. The spiritual basis of Jewish life is being everywhere destroyed, and we are at present without a central authority which can command the allegiance of traditional Jewry.

THE tremendous loss, the irremediable disaster that is menacing those who from ages past have been wondrously blessed by fellowship with God is the thoughtless neglect of customs, hallowed by the centuries, which have their roots in the religion that enshrines the noblest and loftiest conception of God ever vouchsafed to the mind of man. It is with a real sympathy and understanding of the difficulties in the minds of modern Jews, yet with a passionate conviction that these difficulties are as nothing when compared with the tragedy of loss, that Professor Farbridge, a cultured Jewish scholar, sounds this warning call to his people.

The book reveals that the same change is going on in Judaism as in Christianity. Indeed many of the pages, save for the change of an occasional word, would be as applicable to Christians as to Jews. The Bible's authority and sublimity have been challenged by literary and scientific criticism. Many have lost confidence in it and fail to grasp its abiding and eternal worth. But the author is convinced that if it be read with an adequate knowledge of its language, of the history of the time from which it speaks, it will be its own defense. The moral difficulty felt in accepting some of the earlier stories, as the slaughter of the Canaanites or of the polygamy preached by the heroes of old, vanishes when a sympathetic understanding of the circumstances is gained. Nor has the higher criticism been able to destroy the ancient bulwark of Israel. Science, far from discrediting the Bible, has even aided from time to time the reverent seeker after spiritual truths.

Yet it is hard to conceive how a thoughtful and intelligent Jew whose mind is really disturbed by present-day problems will find much help in the book. He can hardly fail to see that the chapters discussing miracles and higher criticism are completely inadequate and lead nowhere. Higher criticism is not largely anti-Semitic, nor are Wellhausen, Stade, and Duhm the only voices that need be heard. It is a little depressing to hear a man

who might do so much content to find a defense for the unity and Mosaic authorship of the Pentateuch (except the last eight verses of Deuteronomy) in the differences of style between "Paradise Lost" and "Lycidas." Perhaps some day we shall reach a place where we can refrain from seeking to account for some of the marvel stories of a magic-loving age by the X-ray, telephone, and psycho-analysis. But that brighter day will not dawn so long as we feel our chief concern is calking a leaking ship with every bit of new material that comes to our hand. This is but another illustration of the similarity of the problem facing Jew and Christian alike. Professor Farbridge is quite right in his surprise that many scholars (he is courteous enough to use the term) who regard the Old Testament miracles as beyond the grounds of possibility never question the actual occurrence of the Gospel miracles, and even regard them as overwhelming proofs of the Christian revelation.

His book is an earnest and thoughtful apologia for Judaism and at the same time a perfectly clear evidence of the folly of trying or desiring to check the waves of change by blowing upon them.

It is a worth-while task to call attention to the value of this wonderful spiritual heritage. It would be a pity were the heirs to fail to remember that the heritage was made for them, not they for it.

M. S. E.

The Gospel Before the Gospels. BURTON SCOTT EASTON, D.D., Professor of the Interpretation and Literature of the New Testament, the General Theological Seminary, New York City. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons. 1928. Pp. 170. Price, \$1.75.

THE past quarter of a century has seen many changes and developments in the criticism and source-study of the Synoptic Gospels. The year 1901 saw the solution of the documentary side of the Synoptic Problem in the work of B. Weiss and H. J. Holtzmann. The "two-document" hypothesis may be modified; it will hardly be overturned. But although radical deviations from the Weiss-Holtzmann hypothesis have failed to gain followings, scholarship has been in no wise inclined to agree to their historical appraisal of the two documents. For them Mark was a trustworthy, historical document which provided a reliable outline of Jesus' ministry. The second source, "Q," was of even higher authority and was truly apostolic.

In the same year that Weiss and Holtzmann published their views Wrede, that doughty iconoclast of all that was "established beyond a shadow of a doubt," raised his voice in protest. Mark is not to be regarded as a history of Jesus' ministry. It contains a good tradition, to be sure, but of isolated events reworked by the author to fit into his

own theological scheme. Wrede's work was a presage of what was to come. The logical conclusion is what German scholars have called *Formgeschichte*—form history. The stories and sayings in the Gospels are for the most part entirely independent of Jesus. They may be classified into types of folk-tale and tradition, which although originally having little that is specifically Christian were adopted and worked over by Christian teachers in their early preaching. Dibelius elevated form-history to a science, form-criticism, and along with other scholars—Gunkel, Bultmann, Bertram, and Schmidt—used it as the key that would unlock Christian beginnings.

Professor Easton, who will be remembered by the readers of THE CROZER QUARTERLY as the author of a recent commentary on the Gospel of Luke¹, reviews the development and gives a penetrating, though appreciative, criticism. "Form-criticism," he concludes, "may prepare the way to historical criticism, but form-criticism is not historical criticism."

Then follow three chapters in which the author seeks to analyze the materials in the gospel tradition and to determine to what extent they reflect the interest and outlook of the Gospel writers, to what extent that of Jesus and his disciples. In the judgment of Professor Easton there is surprisingly little of a later age read back into the words of Jesus. On the whole the Gospel writers were profoundly respectful of the tradition that they had received, and not only refrained from putting their own ideas into Jesus' mouth but preserved many things that must have been distasteful to them. So the primary historic value of the Synoptists is not for their own age but for the tradition of the teaching of Jesus.

Nor is this restricted to the sayings alone. Many of the stories, especially in those strata of the Gospels that are obviously late, are the purest of legend, yet even these are not to be seen as the mere appropriation of some non-Christian story but due to the elaboration of motives already present in Christian tradition. Indeed behind many of the miracle-stories there may have been an historic incident, although its precise nature may often be irrecoverable. It is one thing to confess inability to ascertain a fact; quite a different thing to deny that there was any fact.

In these six lectures, which were delivered on the Bishop Paddock Foundation in the Seminary in which he is a professor, Doctor Easton has provided a very valuable résumé of the results of recent scholarship. It can hardly fail to be of the greatest service to those who have not the opportunity of watching the development of thought at first hand.

¹ *The Gospel According to St. Luke* (1926, Charles Scribner's Sons) reviewed in THE CROZER QUARTERLY, July, 1926.

The Church and the Russian Revolution. MATTHEW SPINKA, Ph. D., the Chicago Theological Seminary, Chicago, Ill. New York: The Macmillan Company. 1927. Pp. 326. Price, \$2.50.

WHAT have we not heard concerning the Russian Revolution, Bolshevism, and the Soviet Government! What tales have come to our ears of immoralities practised, of communism in its far extreme of community rights in women and children, of atheism and the utter renunciation of all religion as an opiate of the mind! What reports, of seeming official authentication, have been scattered abroad, calculated to arouse us to this Red danger threatening not only our own Constitution and government but our own precious religious safeguards as well!

And what have we known of the actual facts?

We may find them clearly and faithfully presented, as perhaps nowhere else, in the above work by one who is a trained investigator, a historian who is master of the Russian language, who spent months in Russia studying his subject at first hand and who is entirely impartial in his attitude toward his material. He brings us, therefore, the unbiased conclusions of one who has had the privilege of personal interviews with the leaders of church and government, who has associated with the common people and who also frankly spreads upon the pages of his book abundant source material gathered from documents and manifestoes of government and synod as well as various other publications from which the candid reader may form his own judgments.

The author gives us the historical background in his first chapter, under the caption, "The Roots of the Matter." The Russian Church was Byzantine, mystical. True Christianity consisted in asceticism. "Logic is the work of the devil. 'The spread of popular education is positively harmful.'" Religion was completely subjected to the State, with the tsar official head of the church and obedience to him commanded by God. He "is more than an heir to his ancestors, he is a successor to the Cæsars of the Eastern Empire, the builders of the church and its conclaves, the founders of the very creed of the Faith of Christ." The church thus bolstered the autocracy of the tsar and acted as "the spiritual police of the autocratic state."

In 1905 there came to the throne the weak Nickolas II, last of the Russian tsars, a man completely under the influence of Pobiedonostsev, "ober-procuror" of the Holy Synod, and the tsarina—well-meaning but religiously "hysterical." Under these influences, Russia like Turkey was ruled by "autocracy tempered by assassinations." Famine added to the terror of the people, and in their struggle for relief there arose labor

organizations, socialism, and finally the Bolshevik or majority party favoring centralized, military control and action.

The granting of a limited monarchical form of government on October 30, 1905, gave promise of relief but the control of the Duma by the Holy Synod rendered that body ineffectual for democracy. The dictatorship of the immoral impostor, Rasputin, through his amazing influence over the fanatical tsarina, was the significant factor in the revolution culminating, March, 1917, in the overthrow of the Romanov dynasty which simply fell of its own inherent weakness.

The balance of the book gives trustworthy information on those questions of Sovietism concerning which every thoughtful American has long sought the facts. We discover that the provisional government was surprisingly slow in introducing into the religious sphere even those changes to which the dominant political parties had long before committed themselves. Full religious liberty was granted July 17, 1917. At the very time the provisional government fell to the Soviets, October 25, 1917, and amid the cannonade of the soldiers, the freely elected delegates of the Orthodox churches of Russia, in assembly at Moscow ("the first after two centuries of the oppressive reign of the Holy Synod"), declared the patriarchate restored and the Metropolitan Tikhon to be duly elected Patriarch of all Russia.

As to legislation regarding religion, Doctor Spinka brings proof that the Soviet, at first, did not interfere with the church but that in December of 1917 decrees did begin to appear which revealed the trend for future enactments. All land was declared a national landed fund, to be controlled by land committees. On December 11, all schools were placed under a Commissariat of National Education. December 18, it was announced that the republic would acknowledge civil marriages only. January 23, 1918, Church and State were made completely separate as well as church and school. Freedom of conscience, however, was granted though no religious instruction was permitted in any government school. For the first time in 1,000 years the government of Russia was organized on a strictly secular basis.

So far as the charge of atheism is concerned it may be said that the Communistic Party is atheistic, but, as the Soviet Government, this party is not, nor has it ever attempted to force atheism on the country. It is purely secular and as such grants to all religious groups entire freedom in all religious matters, the first Russia has ever known in its history. Necessarily the Orthodox Church has been thrown into disorder and has lost many cherished privileges, especially the financial support of the government; but the Soviets stand firm on their position. The famine of 1921 also threw the

leaders of the Church into conflict with the Soviets because of the insistence of the latter, against the protest of the former, that the sacred objects of the church edifices should be sold for famine relief. It was the opposition of Tikhon to this order that brought persecution and death to many of the ecclesiastics in 1922 and also caused a schism within the Church.

The significance the author gives to the Russian crisis is arresting. It raises the question of the permanent place of Christianity in the world. The problem in Russia confronts Christianity in every other country. For the first time in history it finds itself "in a scientific-minded world." Christianity, on the other hand, is pre-scientific in its ideology and method which puts it into "increasingly disharmonious relation with the modern world-view." Can Christianity, by practising "the Jesus way of life" become the saving element in our militant materialism?

If Russian Christianity conceives its mission in terms of character building, energizing spiritual force, which transforms human lives from sordid self-seeking to altruistic service of others—elements, which, by the way, are not uncommon in the "atheistic" Russian communism, which nevertheless thinks of itself as irreligious—and if without any interference with the proper sphere of science, it adds to the scientific attitude a passion for a nobler character and a better social order, and a poetic interpretation of the spiritual intuitions of the human race, no one needs to be in anxiety about its survival.

R. E. E. H.

Does Civilization Need Religion? REINHOLD NIEBUHR. New York: The Macmillan Company. 1927. Price, \$2.00.

THIS book makes a strange and varied but profound impression upon one. After reading it one wants to sit down calmly and think, meditating not only upon the very serious problems it raises and seeks to solve but also upon that personal background out of which the reader is certain the book has had its origin.

Here, he muses, is a man who is a minister, a preacher of the gospel of Jesus Christ. He is dead in earnest; a lover of his fellow-men, anxiously eager to relieve their conditions and wipe out those evils that so tragically destroy the possibilities of strong individual characters and a beautiful social order. He is not concerned about the intellectual problems of Christianity but he is mightily concerned about the practical. Can Christianity function in present-day American society and serve to the relief of wrongs so evident and prevalent?

He is minister in a great city—an industrial center of America. He lives in the midst of great human problems, pressing in upon him daily. Questions of creed, beliefs, doctrines do not give him difficulty but he does yearn to make Christianity effective in human life in this struggling,

succeeding city of mass production. And he is baffled. Has Christianity *anything* to say in the presence of these moral relationships? Doctor Niebuhr is oppressed by the sense of the futility of preaching. A pessimistic note runs throughout his entire book.

No man has seen political, economic, social conditions more clearly or has written of them more vividly than has he. His scalpel cuts keen and reveals the truth. Religion is held by the "middle class" who have nothing to gain and nothing to lose. They have life's satisfactions and are content. Science reigns supreme and human values are forgotten. Those who are seeking a new social order are striving without power in their social idealism. For "religion" alone can save. But what is "religion"? The author is not very certain, but it is at least "other-worldliness" . . . and yet, with his evident knowledge of Christianity's history, Doctor Niebuhr has a suspicion that it is just this element that has put us in the situation in which we find ourselves today.

What then is to be done? "Religion" must be made to function in all the realms of human affairs. It must operate in all our social relations that those activities may be spiritualized. We all agree with him! But how? It is the age-old question. Doctor Niebuhr has no answer. He is in despair, pessimistic.

Perhaps the sciences which he seems so greatly to fear have the solution! But that is another story.

R. E. E. H.

Early Church Portraits. JOHN HESTON WILLEY, Ph. D., S. T. D. Edinburgh: T. and T. Clark. 1927.

THIS book belongs to "The Scottish Layman's Library" series which is edited by the Rev. John Adams. It contains short sketches on ten characters of the Christian church from Polycarp to Dante. Each sketch is indeed a vivid description of the main features of that character. It seems a little strange to write upon all these particular men under the caption of the book unless another volume is to follow bearing the title of "Later Church Portraits." But to the layman perhaps these ten men would be a fairer selection than to follow the more rigid line of patristics. The author has a rich vocabulary, a vivid imagination and a "facile pen." If these "portraits" were not given orally to audiences, they very well could be so given, and perhaps one good use the book could serve would be to show the preaching values of church history. Other than that the book has little value. Theologically the author believes in the orthodox message. In the introduction he sets the reader to look for no social origins explaining anything; to him "There was to be founded a kingdom, of which

He (Jesus) was to be King" (see introduction). To the author the Gospels seem to be "Lives of Christ" rather than memoirs to forward a Christian movement. The author lacks scientific procedure in not giving a single reference throughout the entire book. His index of only fifty-four citations is next to nothing. He mixes his probable historical data with current tradition, making no distinction. Dogmatically he asserts that Bartholomew died in India, Andrew in Scythia, etc., as certainly as Peter died in Rome (p. 20). And again he says that Herod killed James without implying which Herod. Also he asserts that Polycarp was the "angel of the Church in Smyrna" (p. 22). And in speaking of John he is just as dogmatic and seems to have no knowledge of the other tradition that says that John died while young. One is inclined to say that this book is a polemic for that kind of Christianity that its author possesses. Outside this use the book hardly calls for further notice. The encyclopædias contain nearly all the facts given here and many more. And in the realm of patristic study Dr. H. B. Swete's book is far more illuminating and does not forget such men as Justin Martyr, Irenæus, the Cappadocians, etc.

PAUL BURROUGHS CLARK.

Current Christian Thinking. GERALD B. SMITH. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

ONE of the series of Handbooks intended to set forth in a readable form the results of the scientific study of religion and ethics. One hesitates to ascribe motives to the writer of a book, but perhaps the author's own words will make clear a concern of the writer as to this book. On page 189 he writes:

Whereas formerly the attempt was made to exalt the faith of our fathers, today concern is being felt for the religion of our children.

Certainly this is a worth-while purpose, and appears to be the principle of procedure.

The method is simple, and consists in brief, readable statements and comparisons of current ways of thinking through the problems of religion; and an estimate of the adequacy of these various ways to meet the demands of reason and modern knowledge.

Its effect is to show the inadequacy of these ways of thinking to make adjustment to modern knowledge and life. The presentations are fair; but the criticisms, while accurate perhaps, sometimes give the sense that more is demanded of the attempts at adjustment than might reasonably be required, more perhaps than would be demanded in other disciplines where harmony is sought.

The supreme aversion of the author, with which the reviewer is in passionate accord, is religions or theologies of authority. The appeal to personality and freedom, to reason and experience, is constant and consistent.

The goal of the examination and discussion is indeed, or might be described as, the religion of personality and freedom, the religion of adventure into the realm of the Spirit; and one leaves off the reading with a sense of broken bonds, and of emerging into the light.

The author proposes not simply analysis and criticism but construction. While he offers in this volume no new dogmatic which will make the adjustment we are all "feeling after, if haply we may find it," he has confidence that we may trust the future to take care of itself.

The chapter on "Evangelical Christianity" is especially worthy as it is profoundly needed, by those who think the liberal is no longer evangelical, and by the liberal himself who may, from much criticism of himself, begin to wonder whether he is still evangelical; and may also admonish the liberal as follows:

Those who are honestly convinced that the revised theological conceptions so current in our schools of higher learning today are true, should be on their guard lest they stop with mere intellectual assent. For a new theology is just as capable of religious barrenness as was the formal orthodoxy which evangelicalism confronted. The evangelical spirit will seek to interpret theology, whether old or new, as the expression of so profound and persuasive an experience of fellowship with God that Christianity will be brought to the attention of men, not as a formal system, but as a Christlike way of living. Those who know the power and joy of this way of life are the real representatives of evangelical Christianity.

S. B. M.

The Unique Status of Man. H. WILDON CARR, of the University of London and the Department of Philosophy, University of Southern California. New York: The Macmillan Company.

THE fifth in the series of lectures, biennially given on The New Era Foundation of the University of Southern California. It is a discussion of the problem of "free-will"; but not by any means a mere rehearsal of the older forms and reasonings. For one who has read and reread the older arguments this is decidedly fresh and invigorating, as well as convincing. Whoever is interested in this problem, and that should be everybody in this day of emphasized mechanism, will find here new reasons for opening the question, to say the least. For the problem of will or freedom is the problem of the problems of morals and religion. Until this is settled, as Professor Irving Babbitt says in the February *Forum*, nothing is settled; while to deny that freedom to man, as though it were settled, either on biological, psychological, or philosophical grounds, is to justify and invigo-

rate all those forms of "expressionism," which are vitiating life, in art, science, music, and education, as well as morals and religion.

The idea of freedom originated in the Christian conception of man's relation to God, and the problem it raises first became explicit in Christian Doctrine.

Such is the announcement by the publisher of the author's thought which justifies him in the initial chapter "The Theological Form of the Free-will Problem." The apostle Paul is credited with this new conception of the freedom of the human spirit and with making it the vitalizing principle of the new religion.

The problem is, however, essentially one of philosophy, even though theological controversy occasioned it.

It is Paul's doctrine of justification by faith in which we have the triumphant affirmation of human freedom, the self-assertion of the spirit. Faith for Paul meant the rejection of authority, emancipation, the exercise of reason, "*the grasp of truth by intellectual effort*. Paul was a rationalizer and a modernist." The act of faith stamped the believer with the spiritual seal as a member of the family of God's elect.

But there are two concepts of the nature of "free-will" each of which may appeal to reason, authority, to Scripture; and the two answers are mutually destructive—as might be said the Calvinistic and the Arminian—and both have their difficulties. Such is the problem in its theological form.

Intimating that these two concepts may be merged into the concept of freedom as self-determination, in the "Metaphysical Aspect of the Problem" the author finds the principle of determinism and that of "free-will" best expressed in Spinoza and Leibnitz, the difference in their views arising in the fact that Spinoza takes his idea of cause from the science of mathematics, while Leibnitz takes his idea from reflection on the organic world. But here again the author finds that there is only theoretical opposition and practical identity. The argument cannot well be summarized.

In similarly clear and concise way the rise of the idea of natural religion is found to spring from the thesis of freedom, and

We see emerging a new idea of freedom, consonant with the conception of an exuberant, beneficent nature which in time will dominate the whole intellectual world.

"Mechanism and Scientific Materialism" as a chapter, proposes the new aspect of this problem which scientific advance has brought with it. The materialistic conception of nature which appeared to exclude the idea of freedom "had its Achilles heel"—its psychological theory. There has been more than a reaction against materialism, there has been a scientific revolution. The new hypothesis of the electrical construction of matter

has made the whole science of physics antiquated. Psychology has a concrete subject-matter, and neither matter nor its activities is it.

An involved consideration of "Mind and Nature and the Principle of Relativity," too involved for summary statement, is made likewise to contribute to the argument in an impressive metaphysical doctrine of free-will. Less involved and built upon well-understood analogies, the concluding chapter on "Living Activity" presents the argument from the principle of individuality as follows:

Living activity manifests itself in real actions which are always individual; individual actions are distinguished from mechanical movements by their freedom; free actions are self-determined responses to external situations and are not externally determined. The principle of individuality which governs living activity is the contrary of the principle of reciprocity which governs all material movement. . . Freedom, free-will, we possess originally of right, and the determinism on which efficiency depends is brought about by the limitation of that freedom. Life and materiality seem to present an absolute contrast, so that we may say the principle of one is freedom, and of the other necessity.

The case for freedom is well and convincingly argued. Even the synthesis of freedom and determinism, which the author claims to have made, is reached by clear recognition of the primacy and transcendence of freedom, while determinism becomes self-determinism. The will creates, being the primary reality and fact, a body of efficiency factors and passes them into the realm of habit, custom, and accepted impulses, as a kind of spiritual economy in its functioning. The fuller and richer this transference of activity to the realm of habit or character so called, the freer the man for fresh rational adventure. So that in reply to the common objection that man is determined and has the illusion or feeling of freedom, it might be said that determinism is an economic illusion of a free being who fails to recognize his own freedom as the creator of his own habits or conditionings.

S. B. M.

God in Us—The World Faith of Quakerism. DANIEL GIBBONS. New York: The Macmillan Company.

IN terse English, printed in large bold-face type, this volume presents in concise form the unequivocal statement the faith of a people, neither church nor sect, that has had an influence, is indeed still having an influence, out of all proportion to its numbers.

Freely admitting that many of the misunderstandings of the Quakers current today have been due to the people themselves, he makes clear the meaning of their peculiarities and their contentions for spiritual religion, their dress and speech, their rejection of heathen names for days and months, their opposition to war, and the taking of oaths, etc.

Their one contention is the doctrine of the Inner Light which he states as follows:

The Eternal hath revealed himself to his children in all ages by an infinite variety of means; but the most authentic, because the most immediate, revelation is that communicated directly to the soul by the Eternal Spirit itself, the Inner Light, the Christ Eternal, the immediate experience of the soul with the divine, "Immanuel, which is God in us," the "Something in us, not ourselves, which worketh for righteousness," (or, as George Fox used to preach) "God hath come to teach his people himself."

Recognizing that the Bible, the Historic Church, and Reason are sources (instruments?) of authority, this doctrine affirms that what brought them into existence was the Eternal Spirit overruling, directing the souls of men from all time to eternity.

There is maintained interest for the reader in the statement and exposition of these following conclusions or inferences:

1. That this Light is the divine witness in the soul.
2. That it has been from the beginning.
3. That it has been given to all men.
4. That it transcends but does not supplant all other sources(!) of authority.
5. That it is superior to will and intellect.
6. That it is not to be confounded with conscience, which is the instrument of the Spirit, not the Spirit itself.
7. That the Christ and the Christian dispensation were the outgivings of that divine Light, etc.
8. That the greatest phenomenon resulting from the Divine Presence in the soul is religion; its greatest fruit righteousness; and its most manifest proof the yearning to rise ever upward and nearer to the Infinite.

Aside discussions in the Appendix indicate the difficulties of the practical application of this doctrine, not insuperable, however, in the recognition of the "veiled" authority of the "weighty, the aged, experienced, discreet members of the body" when differences of opinion appear.

The values of this doctrine, however, should be recognized as having distinct worth in the present situation in the religious world, as evidenced by the suggestion that "the very word and thought of *authority* should be abandoned and replaced by the idea and word *guidance*." And further by affirmation that "Truth lies ever ahead." In support of this the author quotes from *The Church of the Spirit*, by Francis G. Peabody:

To the Church of the Spirit, religious faith is not a harbor but a venture; not a cable mooring life to the shore, but the canvas spread to catch the winds of God.

S. B. M.

Adventure: The Faith of Science and the Science of Faith. BURNETT H. STREETER, M. A., D. D. New York: The Macmillan Company. 1928. Pp. 247. Price, \$2.00.

THE title *Adventure* is alluring, in view of its connection with Canon Streeter's name. For research work and thinking are adventures, and Canon Streeter's former works prove that he is an adventurous explorer in history and in philosophy. He is not alone in his adventures. In this volume he is accompanied by Alexander S. Russell, University Lecturer in Inorganic Chemistry, Oxford, and Tutor in Natural Science, Christ Church, Oxford; by John MacMurray, Fellow, Tutor and Jowett Lecturer in Philosophy, Baliol College, Oxford; and by Catherine M. Chilcott, M. A., Fellow and Tutor in Classics, Lady Margaret Hall, Oxford. Adventurer Russell gives many a pleasant surprise in his chapter "The Dynamics of Science"; his companion, the Jowett Lecturer, leads into some thrilling moments in his exploration "Beyond Knowledge" and "Objectivity in Religion"; the lady in the exploring party talks entertainingly and with insight on "Myth and Reality"; while the leader of the group is a daring "air pilot" in "Moral Adventures" and in "Finality in Religion." The appositeness of the word adventure in the chapter on "Moral Adventure" is at once apparent from the subjects treated, namely, "In Search of a Morality"; "Code and Experiment," and "The Ethics of Sex."

The occasion of the essay is an interesting story. A group of scholars interested in Science and Religion and in their relation to one another, were accustomed to meet in the home of Miss Lily Dougall at Cumnor. The deaths of several of the friends, including Miss Dougall, shattered the old "Cumnor Group," but it was Miss Dougall's wish that her house, known as Cutts End, should continue to be a "workshop for religious thinking," to use her own phrase. Beginning in March, 1924, at varying intervals, a small group of scientists and philosophers of the post-war generation in Oxford met for work and conferences. Discussions were informal; occasionally others were invited to join the group. The purpose of the conferences was to exchange views and to clarify thinking on significant issues. After more than a year of such interchange of opinions, it became evident that some contributions were really significant. Many of the papers read were deemed worthy of a wider circle of hearers than those that met at Cutts End. The book entitled *Adventure* has grown out of the papers prepared in this "workshop for religious thinking." There is nothing of the workshop, however, in the essays as they appear in print. They are evidences of completed work and artistic skill. It is well worth two dollars to be admitted into the company of the "Cumnor Group."

M. G. E.

The Plastic Age of the Gospel. ANDREW C. ZENOS, D. D., LL. D., Dean and Professor of Historical Theology in McCormick Theological Seminary. New York: The Macmillan Company. 1927. Pp. 264. Price, \$2.75.

PROFESSOR ZENOS has had long experience in the classroom. He is the author of works that have won him reputation for scholarship and skill in exposition. The present volume is the result of many years of reading and reflection. Many of his students have often requested him to give wider currency to his conclusions than the lecture-room made possible. It is well that after much persuasion he has issued this volume. Professor Zenos began his studies when the public was first made acquainted with results of excavations and exploration in "Biblical lands," and when historians had begun to write history with new method and motive. He has grown up in the company of a new generation of interpreters. He has been not only an onlooker but a coworker. He is thereby familiar with new facts and with the new method of interpretation.

The title *The Plastic Age of the Gospel* suggests the character of the period in which the earliest Christian literature arose and also of the nature of the literature itself. The sub-title *A Manual of New Testament Theology*, suggests something more definite than the actual contents of the volume. True, it treats theological material contained in the New Testament, but the treatment is such as one may expect of a Professor of Historical Theology. This renders the volume the more readable and the more in keeping with the "plastic age" in which the various types of theology, if they may be called types, arose.

Professor Zenos arranges his material in four parts: Part I, The Mind of Jesus; Part II, The Earliest of Apostolic Messages; Part III, The Gospel of Paul; Part IV, The Johannine Theology. An extensive bibliography and an index add to the value of the book as a manual.

M. G. E.

Twentieth Century Christianity. FRANK BALLARD. Edinburgh: T. and T. Clark. 1927. Pp. x, 319. Price, \$2.50.

THERE have been many historic types of Christianity. Few of them have been clear manifestations of the divine essence its Founder introduced. The "gospel of Christ" in all its purity and simplicity constitutes "ideal Christianity." The content of this standard religion may be discovered in the "New Testament . . . fairly interpreted . . . in modern light." It may be summed up as "truth and love." That there is "the unique inspiration of the Bible" and that "Christianity is Christ" are the "huge assumptions" upon which the author supports his position.

Judged by the divine pattern, many of the great Christian systems of

the past have been "perversions." The Romanist, the Eschatological, the Puritan, and other branches have been corrupted faiths; Russellism, Mormonism, Theosophy, and such cults have drifted even more remotely from the true norm. The latter set constitute "eccentric" religions. Fundamentalism is "obscurantism." Some striking experiences in Christianity have "approximated" the gospel of Jesus. These include Anglicanism, Methodism, and other evangelical bodies. Each, however, has taken up accretions from the world that makes it a weakened witness of its Lord. Every Christian sect needs a process of purification in order to reproduce the religion of Christ.

But that is not enough! Our century represents a very different civilization from any that preceded it. Such major controlling forces as belief in evolution, practise in democracy, popular education, and other traits, have released strange human desires that only "twentieth-century Christianity" can satisfy. Christians must get back to the spiritual tests of Christ and carry them forward to meet the radical social demands of the present. The author treats twelve conditions of our time requiring the prophetic care of such a ministry. For instance, he devotes over twenty pages to the subject of evolution, and nearly thirty to the proper use of Sunday. Unfortunately, he has pitched most of his suggestive principles of Christianity in the negative form in the epilogue. Though the text is set to meet conditions prevalent in Great Britain, it bears rather directly upon many American problems.

S. G. C.